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Rethinking Judicial Review of
High Volume Agency Adjudication

Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus*
Article III courts annually review thousands of decisions rendered by
Social Security Administrative Law Judges, Immigration Judges, and other
agency adjudicators who decide large numbers of cases in short periods of
time. Federal judges can provide a claim for disability benefits or for
immigration relief—the sort of consideration that an agency buckling under
the strain of enormous caseloads cannot. Judicial review thus seems to help
legitimize systems of high volume agency adjudication. Even so, influential
studies rooted in the gritty realities of this decision-making have concluded
that the costs of judicial review outweigh whatever benefits the process
creates.
We argue that the scholarship of high volume agency adjudication has
overlooked a critical function that judicial review plays. The large numbers
of cases that disability benefits claimants, immigrants, and others file in
Article III courts enable federal judges to engage in what we call “problemoriented oversight.” These judges do not just correct errors made in
individual cases or forge legally binding precedent. They also can and do
identify entrenched problems of policy administration that afflict agency
adjudication. By pressuring agencies to address these problems, Article III
courts can help agencies make across-the-board improvements in how they
handle their dockets. Problem-oriented oversight significantly strengthens
the case for Article III review of high volume agency adjudication.
This Article describes and defends problem-oriented oversight through
judicial review. We also propose simple approaches to analyzing data from
agency appeals that Article III courts can use to improve the oversight they
offer. Our argument builds on a several-year study of social security
disability benefits adjudication that we conducted on behalf of the
Administrative Conference of the United States. The research for this study
gave us rare insight into the day-to-day operations of an agency struggling
to adjudicate huge numbers of cases quickly and a court system attempting
to help this agency improve.
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor of Law, University of
Arizona Rogers College of Law. The authors thank BJ Ard, Barbara Atwood, Faisal Chaudry, Andy
Coan, Ellie Bublick, Toni Massaro, Nina Rabin, and Christopher Walker for helpful comments on
earlier drafts. This Article benefited from a presentation at a September 2017 conference on agency
adjudication jointly hosted by the Administrative Conference of the United States and the American
Bar Association.
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Introduction
Federal administrative agencies adjudicate huge numbers of cases.
Administrative law judges (ALJs) working for the Social Security
Administration (SSA), “probably the largest adjudication agency in the
western world,”1 decided 629,337 claims for disability benefits in 2013. 2 That
year, the country’s immigration judges (IJs) completed 253,942 “matters,”3

1. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 28–29 (2003).
2. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., JUSTIFICATIONS OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 144 (2014).
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK A2 (2014).
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and veterans’ law judges working for the Board of Veterans Appeals
disposed of 41,910 veterans’ benefits cases.4 ALJs at the Office of Medicare
Hearings and Appeals issued 79,377 decisions in cases involving Medicare
payments and coverage, an effort quickly swamped by the 384,151 new
filings the agency received in 2013. 5 Such immense caseloads require agency
adjudicators to work with astonishing speed. The average SSA ALJ decided
nearly 540 cases in 2013, or more than two per workday, 6 and the average IJ
that year resolved matters for more than 1,000 immigrants. 7 The quality of
adjudication often buckles under this furious pace, and criticism for slipshod,
inconsistent decision-making has long dogged these agencies. 8
With their power of judicial review, the federal courts sit atop this
mountain of adjudication. 9 Time-strapped agency adjudicators have to rule
under conditions hardly conducive to thoughtful deliberation. The fact that a
federal judge offers a backstop against arbitrary decision-making thus offers
something of a psychological salve. 10 Whatever happens within the agency,
so the thinking goes, the unfairly denied disability claimant or the immigrant
wrongly threatened with deportation can always get justice in an Article III
court. For this reason and others, judicial review is thought to “secure an
imprimatur of legitimacy for administrative action.”11
But reality intrudes on this appealing view. The availability of judicial
review for what we call “high volume agency adjudication”—adjudication
by agencies whose caseloads and available personnel limit adjudicators to no
more than a minimal amount of time per case—means that the federal courts
feed on a sizable diet of administrative appeals. The 7,225 cases immigrants

4. 2013 BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANN. REP. 24.
5. Statistics are available at Admin. Conference of the U.S. & Stanford Law Sch., Adjudication
Research: Caseload Statistics, S TAN. U., https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics
[https://perma.cc/943F-XSRS].
6. HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, S TATISTICAL APPENDIX ON ACHIEVING GREATER
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY D ISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN E MPIRICAL S TUDY AND
SUGGESTED REFORMS 6 (2013); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., AUDIT
REPORT: T HE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S EFFORTS TO E LIMINATE THE HEARINGS
BACKLOG 4 (2015).
7. FY 2013’s 253,942 completed immigration matters were decided by 253 immigration judges
on the bench that year. HUMAN R IGHTS F IRST, T HE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURT: A BALLOONING
BACKLOG T HAT REQUIRES ACTION 1 (2016), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/usimmigration-court-ballooning-backlog-requires-action [https://perma.cc/Z83W-7LC8].
8. E.g., KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 1–2; Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 S TAN. L. REV. 295, 302–03 (2007); James D. Ridgway, A
Benefits System for the Information Age, 7 VETERANS L. REV. 36, 44 (2015).
9. The federal courts can review agency decisions subject to the limits Congress specifies. Five
Flags Pipe Line Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 854 F.2d 1438, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
10. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) (describing
judicial review as a “necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of
administrative power which purports to be legitimate”).
11. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101
HARV. L. REV. 915, 942 (1988).
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filed in 2013, for instance, accounted for 12.8% of new federal appeals that
year.12 These appeals and others from agencies are indisputably significant
to the judicial business of the federal courts.
But is federal court litigation likewise important to harried adjudicators
drowning in claims or the agencies that struggle to manage them? The federal
courts review only a tiny fraction of the cases agency adjudicators decide—
only 3% of SSA ALJ decisions, for example, 13 and only about .03% of
decisions by the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals. 14 Whatever
legitimacy the Article III courts promise must seem like a distant mirage for
the vast majority of immigrants, claimants, and others as they litigate in
obscure hearing rooms, far away from the grandeur of the federal courts.
Doubts that judicial review helps to improve high volume agency
adjudication have thus surfaced in administrative law scholarship, perhaps
none more importantly than in the seminal studies of social security disability
adjudication that Jerry Mashaw wrote in the 1970s and 1980s.15
This Article defends the federal courts’ involvement in high volume
agency adjudication. It has its roots in our sense of what happens day-to-day
in hearing offices, immigration courts, and federal judges’ chambers around
the country. We recently completed a two-year study of social security
disability benefits litigation, conducted at the behest of the Administrative
Conference of the United States. 16 This study required an extensive
quantitative analysis of district court decision-making, as well as scores of
interviews with agency officials, ALJs and their support staff, federal judges,
and private lawyers. It thus gave us a rich perspective on almost every aspect
of federal court involvement with the disability benefits adjudication process.
A theoretical companion to the report we produced for the Administrative
Conference, this Article uses the trove of information we assembled to inform
our understanding of what exactly the federal courts can be—and in some
instances are—up to when they review decisions issued by overworked,
under-resourced agency adjudicators.
12. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, at tbl.B-3 (2013), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B03Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT29DESF].
13. Nat’l Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimaints’ Representatives, Federal Court Filings Increase, SOC.
SEC. F., Aug. 2013, at 14, 14.
14. In FY 2014, claimants filed only twenty-five Medicare appeals in the federal courts. Email
from Katherine E. Hosna, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to David Marcus, Professor of
Law, Univ. of Ariz. Rogers Coll. of Law (May 22, 2017, 12:22 PM) (on file with authors).
15. E.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 189–90 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW ET
AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A S TUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 146–47 (1978); Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption
of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1323 (2014); Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV.
731, 778, 780 (2003).
16. See JONAH B. GELBACH & D AVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY D ISABILITY
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2016).
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Our main contribution is to identify a previously unappreciated function
that courts perform when they review high volume agency adjudication.
Judges correct adjudicators’ errors, and they forge precedent to regulate
agency decision-making. These jobs are well known, although this Article
provides a badly needed reassessment of how well courts tackle them. The
function not evident to critics of judicial review is a task we call “problemoriented oversight.” Courts identify and respond to entrenched problems of
internal agency administration that can afflict adjudication. When bias
discolors an IJ’s decision-making and the agency does not respond, for
example, courts can do so effectively. When the SSA issues a guidance
document that distorts ALJ orders denying disability benefits claims, the
federal courts can push the agency to correct course. Problem-oriented
oversight involves more than the correction of adjudicator error or the
issuance of precedent-setting opinions. The federal courts use various tools
at their disposal to hold agencies accountable and insist that they improve.
Added to the other functions federal courts discharge, problem-oriented
oversight strengthens the case for Article III review of high volume agency
adjudication.
Our argument toggles between the descriptive and the normative. Courts
presently engage in problem-oriented oversight. We identify the function and
describe how federal judges perform it. We also explain how courts can use
a straightforward data gathering and analysis method to conduct oversight
more rigorously. Finally, we defend the federal courts’ oversight capacity.
Institutional features of courts and agencies limit how well federal judges can
correct adjudicators’ errors and regulate agencies through precedent. These
impediments pose less of a problem to courts’ oversight function. By relying
upon a process that requires aggrieved parties to bring problems to their
attention, the federal courts can assemble information about poor agency
performance efficiently. Their independence from agencies and Congress
enables federal judges to address pathologies afflicting agency decisionmaking without politics or other agency priorities getting in the way. Finally,
the federal courts’ geographic dispersion and prestige make them effective
overseers of a sprawling system of agency adjudication, and the sort of data
gathering and analysis problem-oriented oversight requires fit within courts’
competencies.
Understanding problem-oriented oversight is important for several
reasons. First, appeals from overwhelmed agency adjudicators compose a
large chunk of the federal courts’ docket. In 2013, for instance, claimants
appealed 18,779 SSA ALJ decisions to federal district courts, 17 nearly

17. Appeals to Court as a Percentage of Appealable AC Dispositions, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC04_NCC_Filed_Appealable.html
[https://perma.cc/
TS3M-73RE].
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equaling federal habeas corpus filings. 18 A fully informed perspective on
what Article III judges do on a daily basis requires an appreciation for
problem-oriented oversight.
Second, legislators, judges, agency officials, and scholars frequently
call for changes to various systems of high volume agency adjudication.
Proposals have included the centralization of judicial review in a single
Article III court,19 retrenchment of Article III review, 20 and the end to
Article III review altogether. 21 To our minds, problem-oriented oversight,
when added to the other functions judges discharge when they oversee high
volume agency adjudication, tips an otherwise equivocal normative balance
in favor of the current system. But the costs and benefits of judicial review
are difficult to measure with precision. Reasonable people may ultimately
disagree with our assessment of other functions’ efficacy and what problemoriented oversight adds to the case they present for judicial review. At the
least, however, any suggestion to replace Article III review is incomplete
unless it grapples with how the change would affect the federal courts’
capacity to discharge all of the functions they perform, including problemoriented oversight.
Third, although courts do engage in problem-oriented oversight, some
do so unevenly. In certain instances, federal judges have not yet addressed
problems of internal agency administration that need a response. Our
description and defense of problem-oriented oversight is an attempt to spur
courts to execute this function more evenly and aggressively. Finally,
problem-oriented oversight is not something exclusive to high volume
agency adjudication. Courts have the capacity to perform this function in any
domain where they review large numbers of decisions made by other
institutions.22 An appreciation for problem-oriented oversight and how it
works can improve the contributions to good government that generalist
judges make in a number of fields. 23
Part I explains why we use immigration and disability benefits
adjudication as the two exemplar systems we draw upon in this Article. It

18. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, supra note 12, at tbl.C-2A, http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02ASep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4MN-4RRH].
19. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1685–
86 (2010).
20. Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 679, 725–26 (2002).
21. Id. at 728.
22. See, e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring)
(blasting the “ridiculous” fact that a police detective with an extensive record of improper conduct
was “sent to interrogate a suspect without a tape recorder, a video recorder, a witness or any other
objective means of documenting the interrogation”).
23. For an argument that criminal courts should engage in a version of the oversight we describe
here, see Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (2016).
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also gives brief introductions to both, to provide basic background for the
discussion that follows. Part II includes an extensive assessment of the
previously identified functions that the federal courts play when they decide
appeals from high volume agency adjudicators. Although our reasons differ,
we ultimately agree with Mashaw’s influential critique; courts cannot
discharge these functions successfully enough to justify the case for
Article III involvement in high volume agency adjudication. In Part III, we
define problem-oriented oversight and explain how courts engage in it. We
also offer a method for data gathering and analysis that courts can use to
perform the function more rigorously. Part IV defends problem-oriented
oversight through judicial review, stressing the federal courts’ institutional
advantages as reasons why the task suits them.
I.

Disability Benefits and Immigration Adjudication

A.

The Exemplar Agencies

Federal administrative adjudication comes in many varieties.
Adjudication by the five ALJs working for the Securities and Exchange
Commission represents one variant. They preside over proceedings that often
last months and resemble civil litigation in Article III courts.24 A world apart
is a tribunal like the Veterans Administration’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals.
Its sixty-one veterans’ law judges decided 41,910 cases in 2013, or 687 per
adjudicator. 25 This sort of high volume adjudication poses a distinctive set of
challenges. How can large numbers of adjudicators administering the same
complex regulatory regime decide cases consistently? How can they render
high-quality decisions without allowing a huge backlog of claims to grow?
What ensures that adjudicators, worn down by an unending river of cases, do
not burn out or become jaded? Finally, can these adjudicators make decisions
that will withstand federal judicial scrutiny? Should they be forced to do so?
To assess the contributions federal courts can make to these questions’
answers, we draw on the illustrative experiences of the SSA and the
Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
A number of federal agencies engage in high volume adjudication. Table 1
lists those agencies whose hearing-level adjudicators decide more than one
case per workday. 26

24. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2016); Breon S. Peace & Elizabeth
Vicens, Changes and Challenges in the SEC’s ALJ Proceedings, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & F IN. REG. (Nov. 12, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/12/changesand-challenges-in-the-secs-alj-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/42X9-AML2].
25. All data in this Part on caseloads and numbers of agency adjudicators come from Admin.
Conference of the U.S. & Stanford Law Sch., Adjudication Research: Caseload Statistics, STAN.
U., https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics [https://perma.cc/943F-XSRS].
26. By “hearing-level” we mean adjudicators who hold merits hearings to gather evidence, hear
from witnesses, and so forth.

GELBACH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1104

5/17/2018 8:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:1097

Table 1. High Volume Agency Adjudication
Number of
Decisions,
FY 2013

Number of
Agency
Adjudicators

Decisions per
Adjudicator

41,910

61

687

1,258

4

314.5

Office of Medicare
Hearings and
Appeals

79,377

65

1221.2

HHS Provider
Reimbursement
Board

1,833

5

366.6

EOIR

253,942

248

1024

SSA

793,580

1486

534

Agency Name
Board of Veterans’
Appeals
Department of
Agriculture
Administrative
Review Branch

We use the EOIR and SSA for several reasons. First, for a long time
these agencies have adjudicated more cases than any other.27 A study of high
volume agency adjudication that did not reflect the EOIR’s and SSA’s
experiences with the federal courts would offer narrow instruction. Second,
both of these agencies generate significant numbers of federal court appeals.
Due to a recent spike, ALJs at the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals
(OMHA) now decide hundreds of thousands of cases each year. Yet very few
of the medical service providers contesting a reimbursement decision
ultimately seek judicial review. The federal courts received only twentyseven appeals from OMHA ALJs in 2016. 28 Likewise, veterans appealed only
109 cases to the Federal Circuit in FY 2015, 29 a year the Board of Veterans’

27. The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals now has a caseload roughly equal to EOIR’s.
This is a recent change, with filings growing 315% between 2010 and 2016. OFFICE OF MEDICARE
HEARINGS AND APPEALS, FY 2018 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 7 (2017).
28. Hosna, supra note 14.
29. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015, at tbl.B-8 (2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/B08Sep15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HV8HEZZ].
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Appeals received 69,957 cases. 30 In contrast, social security and immigration
appeals to the federal courts number in the thousands every year. For an
agency like the OMHA, judicial review truly is a mirage. For the SSA and
the EOIR, it is a more meaningful component in an overall system of
adjudication.
Third, decisions go directly from the SSA and the EOIR to the Article III
courts, without some other independent tribunal involved as an intermediary.
Before veterans can appeal to the Federal Circuit, they first must litigate
before the Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims (CAVC), an Article I
tribunal independent of the Veterans’ Administration. 31 Adjudicators at the
Internal Revenue Service’s Office of Appeals decide more than 40,000 cases
each year. Appeals from their orders go almost entirely to the U.S. Tax Court,
also an Article I tribunal, before appeals can proceed to a federal appellate
court.32 No such court stands between the EOIR and the courts of appeals, or
between the SSA and the district courts, to provide an intermediate level of
oversight.
Notwithstanding the agencies’ distinctive features, lessons from the
EOIR’s and SSA’s interactions with the federal courts can readily inform
critical evaluations of other systems of judicial review. Whether direct
oversight by Article III courts succeeds should inform judgments of whether
an Article I intermediary works better, for instance. Whether Congress
should raise or reduce amount-in-controversy requirements for OMHA
appeals, to use another example, should depend at least in part on the
desirability of judicial review in Article III courts. 33 Also, much of what can
be learned from the interactions between the EOIR and the federal courts, or
from those between the SSA and the federal courts, does not depend on the
precise configuration of judicial review that these systems’ designs involve.
The CAVC, for instance, could engage in the sort of data gathering we
describe in Part III and use what it assembles to identify and respond to the
kind of problems we identify.

30. 2015 BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANN. REP. 17; see also 2015 U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS ANN. REP., https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2015AnnualReport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDX8-XS2K].
31. Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell
Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 505 (2011).
32. Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More
Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1196–97 (2008).
33. One of the reasons why so few OMHA decisions get appealed to the federal courts is the
amount-in-controversy requirement that federal court jurisdiction over these cases requires. See
Medicare Appeals Amount in Controversy Threshold Amounts, 81 Fed. Reg. 65,651 (Sept. 23,
2016) (announcing 2017 amount-in-controversy threshold amounts as $160 for ALJ hearings and
$1,560 for judicial review).
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A Brief Primer on the SSA and the EOIR

The rest of this Article draws upon the EOIR’s and the SSA’s
relationships with the federal courts to inform our claims about judicial
review and the functions it plays in the context of high volume agency
adjudication. Both systems have endless complexities, but a basic orientation
to each should suffice for what follows.
As of June 2017, the EOIR, part of the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ), employed about 325 IJs who work in dozens of immigration courts
scattered around the country. 34 Cases can get before IJs in several ways. An
immigrant who claims to be fleeing persecution can apply for asylum with
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.35 If USCIS rejects her
application, it will forward her case to an IJ for an asylum hearing. 36
Alternatively, the government might initiate removal proceedings against an
undocumented immigrant picked up at a work site, or against a noncitizen
arrested for a crime. These cases go directly to IJs for adjudication. The IJ
holds a hearing and issues a decision on the immigrant’s asylum petition or
request for cancellation of removal.37 If the immigrant loses, she can ask the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a sixteen-member appellate tribunal
located at EOIR’s headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia, to review the IJ’s
decision.38 The immigrant can appeal from an adverse BIA decision to “the
court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge
completed the proceedings.”39
The SSA’s Offices of Hearings Operations and of Analytics, Review,
and Oversight encompass an enormous system of disability benefits
adjudication. A person who believes that his impairments prevent him from
working applies for disability benefits at one of the SSA’s 1,300 field
offices.40 If initially denied, and if denied again upon reconsideration, the
claimant can request a hearing before an ALJ.41 (From this point on, “ALJ”

34. Press Release, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for Immigration
Review Swears in 11 Immigration Judges (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr
/executive-office-immigration-review-swears-11-immigration-judges
[https://perma.cc/Q4EPJHB3]. As of the time of writing, the EOIR is expanding the IJ corps considerably. Statement of
James McHenry, Acting Director, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Before the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Border Security, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of Rep., Nov. 1, 2017,
at 3.
35. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states
[https://
perma.cc/G544-VUJF].
36. Id.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012).
38. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2017); Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/8ZQQ-VG4V].
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
40. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 16–17.
41. See id. at 17–18.
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refers to an SSA ALJ.) The ALJ works with about 1,400 judicial colleagues
in one of 160 hearing offices around the country.42 Aided by a “decision
writer,” the SSA’s version of a law clerk, the ALJ issues a written decision
after considering the claimant’s medical records, his hearing testimony, and
other evidence.43 If the decision goes against the claimant, he can appeal to
the SSA’s Appeals Council, located in the same nondescript Falls Church
office building. After a workup by an “analyst,” who also functions as a law
clerk, the case goes to one of dozens of appellate adjudicators for a decision.44
If the claimant loses again, he can appeal to a federal district court, typically
the one in the district where he resides. 45
II.

The Justifications for Judicial Review

Disability benefits adjudication belongs as an exemplar in a study of
judicial review in part because it has attracted the most exhaustive attention.
No treatment of SSA decision-making is more important than the landmark
report Mashaw and his colleagues compiled in 1978. They identified several
possible functions that judicial review performs, including the following:
• A “corrective function”: courts can correct erroneous agency
decisions.
• A “regulative function”: courts can induce agency adjudicators
to decide cases more accurately, either through fear of judicial
reversal (“the in terrorem effect”) or by forcing them to abide
by court-fashioned rules (“the precedential effect”).
• A “legitimizing function”: review of an agency’s decision by an
independent judiciary can increase public confidence in the
legitimacy of outcomes.
• A “critical function”: courts offer agencies a “steady stream” of
feedback that they can use to improve, and that is valuable for
its own sake.
• A “public information function”: court decisions “serve as a
window on an agency whose operations would otherwise be
largely invisible.”46
Primarily assessing the corrective and regulative functions, the Mashaw
group concluded that judicial review’s benefits for the adjudication of social
security disability claims did not justify its costs. 47 Decades later, this claim

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 20–23.
Id. at 27–28.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2016); see also GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 30–35.
MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 136–37.
Id. at 146–47.
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continues to reverberate in discussions of whether the federal courts should
review agency adjudication. 48
The Mashaw group’s discussion remains the most comprehensive and
trenchant analysis of judicial review of high volume agency adjudication. It
thus offers a good template for an inquiry into what functions judicial review
can serve and how well it can perform them. Revisited four decades later,
much of the Mashaw group’s skepticism remains warranted, and not just for
disability benefits adjudication. What follows updates and elaborates on the
Mashaw group’s analysis, with a focus on judicial review’s error correction,
regulative, and critical functions. 49 In any odd instance, the federal courts can
discharge one or more of these functions well. But institutional features of
courts and agencies prompt doubts that the former can do so reliably enough
to place judicial review of high volume agency adjudication on stable
normative footing.
A.

The Corrective Function
Plenty of appeals filed in the federal courts involve mistakes made by
agency adjudicators. To think otherwise requires unwarranted confidence in
the internal agency appellate tribunals that stand between first-line
adjudicators and the federal courts. Year after year, the SSA requests a
voluntary remand in about 15% of cases appealed to the federal courts. 50
These “RVRs” happen only when an SSA lawyer and the Appeals Council
conclude that the lawyer cannot defend the ALJ’s decision as compliant with
the agency’s own view of social security law and policy. 51 Disability appeals
go to the federal courts only after Appeals Council review, so RVRs amount
to a concession that internal appellate review sometimes fails.
Errors surely remain for the federal courts to correct, and federal courts
surely correct errors. But the Mashaw group doubted that courts can do so
reliably. We disagree. Nonetheless, the opportunity cost of court-based error
correction unsettles its contribution to the case for judicial review.
1. The Baseline Problem.—The Mashaw group questioned the capacity
of courts to correct errors because of doubts that judges could evaluate
48. E.g., Bagley, supra note 15, at 1330.
49. Following the Mashaw group’s lead, we do not assess the legitimizing and public
information functions at any length. Given the small numbers of claimants and immigrants who
avail themselves of federal court review, we doubt that, for the average person caught up in high
volume agency adjudication, the distant prospect of judicial review meaningfully legitimizes the
exercise of agency adjudicator power. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 147 (discounting the
legitimizing function for a similar reason). Courts do broadcast information about agency
adjudication that might not otherwise surface, but a judgment about the value of judicial review
should account for the type of information publicized. When courts engage in problem-oriented
oversight, they bring to light information germane to a critical evaluation of agency adjudication.
50. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 31.
51. Id. at 32.

GELBACH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/17/2018 8:31 PM

Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication

1109

disability claims as accurately as ALJs.52 The problem involves a contrast
between courts’ and ALJs’ baselines. ALJs handle a much larger caseload
than federal judges, and ALJs get their cases earlier in the adjudication
process. ALJs thus see a wider array of types of claims than federal judges
do. Moreover, the government cannot appeal, so claimants pick all of the
cases that go to federal court.53 An ALJ may therefore have a different
“cutpoint”54—roughly, the line the ALJ would draw along a given dimension
between disability and no disability—than a federal court for a decision in
favor of the claimant. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate.
Figure 1. ALJ Baseline

Figure 2. Federal Judge Baseline

Most appeals presumably come from the groups of correct and
erroneous denials of what we call “difficult claims.” Bereft of a more diverse
baseline, a federal judge might view what to the ALJ was a relatively weak
52. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 138–39.
53. For analogous information about immigration appeals, see Stephen H. Legomsky,
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1649 n.64 (2010).
54. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 483 (2011).
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claim for benefits as an above-average one.55 “If federal judges saw more of
what ALJs grant,” this ALJ told us, “they would appreciate why a case seems
more borderline to an ALJ.”56
The baseline problem can manifest itself in more granular ways. A
federal judge might react differently than an agency adjudicator to particular
evidence, for instance. With their immense caseloads, ALJs and decision
writers can see letters from the same physicians that use the same phrases to
describe patients with strikingly similar problems. 57 “We know which
doctors are trustworthy and which ones aren’t,” one ALJ told us, “but we
can’t put this in a decision.”58 Likewise, another ALJ said, “claimants can
testify in an obviously coached manner, taught to say just the right thing to
buttress a claim for benefits.”59 IJs may experience the same phenomenon. 60
An ALJ or IJ might correctly discount such evidence, but a federal judge with
a narrower evidentiary baseline might fault the ALJ for doing so.
Federal judges have countervailing institutional advantages, however,
that may exceed whatever edge a richer baseline gives ALJs. Perhaps most
importantly, courts can invest more time and resources in decision-making
than agency adjudicators can. To keep backlogs at bay, the SSA asks its ALJs
to decide between 500–700 cases per year,61 with each involving hundreds of
pages of medical records and a complex regulatory regime. This caseload is
“preposterous,” as one district judge described it. 62 ALJs spend about twoand-a-half hours total on all aspects of a case, and decision writers an
additional eight hours when drafting a decision denying a claim. 63 A case gets
about four hours of analyst time at the SSA’s Appeals Council, and appellate
adjudicators decide five to twelve cases per day.64

55. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 139.
56. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 77.
57. Id. at 77–78.
58. Id. at 78; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (disapproving of the
ALJ’s “unsupported and unwarranted speculation that the . . . doctors were misrepresenting the
claimant’s condition or were not qualified to evaluate it”).
59. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 78.
60. See Jeff Chorney, 9th Cir. Slaps “Incomprehensible Ruling”, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 21, 2005)
(quoting an immigration judge as insisting that arguments from asylum applicants “were all the
same”).
61. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 36.
62. Id. at 73 n.404; see also Alex M. Parker, Recession Is Exacerbating Social Security Claims
Backlog, Panelists Say, GOV’T EXEC. (May 28, 2009), www.govexec.com/oversight/2009/05
/recession-is-exacerbating-social-security-claims-backlog-panelists-say/29262/
[https://perma.cc/3493-TRB7] (quoting a federal magistrate judge describing ALJ workloads as
“unconscionable”).
63. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 14, 24.
64. Id. at 29.
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With 1,000 cases to decide each year, IJs face an even more herculean
task.65 BIA review practices have changed considerably over the last fifteen
years, but at their nadir, caseloads gave board members only 7–10 minutes
for the average case. 66 Federal judges have more time to deliberate.67 In FY
2014, when on average a single IJ had more than 1,400 matters on his
docket,68 the entire federal appellate bench received 54,988 filings. 69 Given
the governing law’s endless details and the often sizable case files assembled
before agency adjudicators, the sheer amount of time a federal judge might
spend compared to an ALJ or IJ can compensate for the narrower baseline.
Another institutional advantage adds to the courts’ side of the ledger.
The decision-writer-to-ALJ ratio is 1:1, 70 for instance, and the law-clerk-toIJ ratio is 1:4.71 District judges have at least two clerks, and court of appeals
judges typically have four.
Agency adjudicators’ baselines may give them a better sense of the
overall disability landscape than what federal judges enjoy. But the time and
resource shortfalls that afflict agency decision-making may make its
adjudicators more error-prone, while federal judges’ comparative surfeit of
both improves their relative capacity to decide cases accurately. How these
advantages and disadvantages balance out is not obvious in the abstract. Not
long ago, however, the SSA’s Chief ALJ conceded that it favors the federal
courts, observing that “most of our decisions that are remanded or reversed
by the federal judges are remanded or reversed simply because our decision
did not comply with our own policy.” 72 Although the SSA has embarked
upon an extensive program of quality improvement since these comments,
the composition of the pool of federal court appeals probably has not changed
all that much since that time, as we argue at length in our report. 73 Federal
judges can probably identify flawed decisions fairly accurately. The same is

65. HUMAN R IGHTS F IRST, REDUCING THE IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG AND DELAYS 5
(2016). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., I-2013-001,
MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION C ASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2012) (documenting flaws in EOIR processes and recommending reforms).
66. Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).
67. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 73.
68. Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration Courts Undermines Justice, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (June 17, 2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org /research/empty-benchesunderfunding-immigration-courts-undermines-justice [https://perma.cc/Q2X6-AXVF].
69. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.1,
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2014
[https://perma.cc/4D8N-T2ES]. During a several-year period in the mid-2000s, the Second and
Ninth Circuits lost their time advantage over IJs and the BIA for immigration cases. But a return of
immigration appeals to lower levels has restored it.
70. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 74.
71. HUMAN R IGHTS F IRST, supra note 65, at 5 n.41.
72. Letter from Frank A. Cristaudo, Chief Admin. Law Judge, Office of Disability Adjudication
and Review, to Colleagues 3 (Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with authors).
73. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 54.
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likely true of immigration appeals, at least for the cases that the federal courts
remand to the agency. 74
2. The Costs of Mistakes.—Whatever the frequency, surely federal
judges err and incorrectly remand cases from time to time. The errorcorrection function cannot justify judicial review if judges make costly
mistakes. Suppose a judge is right eight times out of ten when she remands a
case to the agency. Judicial review would prove harmful on balance if the
costs of the false positives (the two erroneous remands) exceed the benefits
of the true positives (the eight correct ones).
The cost–benefit balance resists an easy assessment in part because the
social value and harms of wrongfully made disability payments and of
payments wrongfully withheld cannot really be measured. 75 One estimate
holds that the wrongful allowance of benefits from 2005–2014 will ultimately
cost the federal treasury $72 billion. 76 On the other side of the ledger is an
actually disabled claimant whose impairments make a correct decision on her
claim “a matter of life and death.” 77 How does the social value of a true
positive compare to the costs of false positives?
Any estimate of this balance must necessarily be crude. But one guess
suggests that the benefits of true positives basically equal the costs of false
positives in the aggregate, at least for social security adjudication, where the
likelihood and costs of false positives relative to other categories of high
volume agency adjudication are highest. 78 A claimant who successfully

74. The federal courts remand many fewer immigration cases, percentage-wise, than social
security appeals. See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. Their prerogative to review IJ
decisions is very narrow. Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 82–83 (2008). We thus presume that, when a federal court remands an
immigration court decision, the likelihood that it is indeed flawed is very high.
75. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. C HI. L.
REV. 28, 48 (1976).
76. Mark J. Warshawsky & Ross A. Marchand, Reforming the System of Review by
Administrative Law Judges in Disability Insurance 15–16 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ.,
Working Paper, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Warshawsky-Reforming-DIReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9J2-UXEC].
77. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 15 (quoting a claimant representative).
78. While we lack equivalent numbers, we are confident that this balance comes out in favor of
judicial review for immigration adjudication as well. For one thing, the federal courts rule very
infrequently in favor of immigrants. The circuits upheld agency decisions in 88.7% of cases in 2016.
John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2015 and Calendar Year 2015 Totals,
IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2016, at 5, 5. Given these numbers, the 11.3% of cases immigrants win
should involve fairly egregious agency errors. Moreover, the harms that result from a false
positive—a decision reversing the BIA when the immigrant should be removed or denied asylum—
should be fairly low. Immigrants who are ordered deported based on their criminal activity almost
never prevail on appeal. Only an immigrant who has no criminal record, and thus presents no
indication of a threat to public safety, is likely to prevail erroneously.
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obtains benefits can expect to receive about $1,500 in cash per month. 79 In
2007, the Government Accountability Office determined that SSA ALJs
eventually grant benefits to 66% of claimants who secure a court remand. 80
We used these numbers together with a range of assumptions about benefits
wrongly provided, the costs associated with ALJ time spent on court
remands,81 the social value of dollars received by disability beneficiaries, and
the social costs of raising the tax revenue needed to pay for benefits and the
operation of the judicial review system, to conduct a back-of-the-envelope
cost–benefit analysis. Our calculations yield two key conclusions. First, using
what we regard as reasonable values of the key normative and positive
parameters, we find that the net social value of judicial review of disability
appeals is likely within $10–15 million of zero. Second, even with extreme
assumptions in either direction, the net social value or cost of judicial review
seems very unlikely to be more than a drop in the bucket when measured
relative to the overall magnitude of disability (and federal court)
expenditures—almost surely less than roughly a tenth of a penny for every
dollar spent on these programs. 82
79. This figure refers to a claimant seeking SSDI benefits, not SSI benefits. Social Security
Administration Oversight: Examining the Integrity of the Disability Determination Appeals
Process, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 50
(2014) (statement of Carolyn Colvin, Acting Comm’r, Social Security Administration). This figure
does not include the value of Medicare coverage that a beneficiary would also receive.
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-331, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, DISABILITY PROGRAMS: SSA H AS T AKEN S TEPS TO ADDRESS CONFLICTING COURT
DECISIONS, BUT NEEDS TO MANAGE DATA BETTER ON THE INCREASING N UMBER OF COURT
REMANDS 16 (2007).
81. In FY 2015, federal courts remanded 8,646 cases to the SSA. Court Remands as a
Percentage of New Court Cases Filed, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals
/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed.html [https://perma.cc/H876-F8BG]. We use this
data and the following assumptions: (1) One-fourth of the 66% of court remands that result in the
payment of benefits do so because ALJs want to get rid of troublesome cases, not because the
claimant is actually disabled; (2) one-half of the 34% of court remands that do not result in the
payment of benefits fail because the federal judge erred, with the other half of remands that do not
result in benefit payment being true negatives, i.e., correct denials of benefits; and (3) court remands
are more difficult than cases heard in the first instance, such that an average ALJ could decide a
dozen new cases during the time required to decide court remands. See GELBACH & MARCUS, supra
note 16, at 48 & n.291.
82. Here we define the benefits as benefits paid to claimants who should receive them. In FY
2015, courts remanded 8,646 cases to the agency. Assuming that ALJs paid benefits to 49.5% of
these claimants correctly (three-fourths of the 66% of claimants who won benefits), judicial review
creates an annual benefit of $77,035,860 in benefits rightly paid to people with disabilities. We let
the social value of paying a dollar in benefits to an eligible claimant be α dollars. For example, if
α = 2, then the social value of providing a dollar to an eligible beneficiary is as good as providing
two dollars to a randomly drawn member of the remainder of the population. Thus, the benefit side
of having judicial review is $77,035,860 times α.
The costs of judicial review include ALJ resources that have to be spent on court remands as
well as those federal judicial resources spent handling disability appeals. As far as ALJ resources
go, each court remand displaces two cases an ALJ could decide in the first instance. Thus, the 8,646
remands from federal court in FY 2015 displaced 17,292 first-instance remands. In FY 2015, 1,519
ALJs, Administrative Law Judge—Federal Salaries of 2015, FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www
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.federalpay.org/employees/occupations/administrative-law-judge/2015
[https://perma.cc/B74TGJL8], decided 507,883 cases, for an average of roughly 334 cases decided per ALJ. 2017 SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, L IMITATION ON ADMIN. EXPENSES 75 tbl.3.34 (2016),
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY17Files/2017LAE.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YKV-YAQ7]. At that
rate, it would take roughly 52 ALJs to decide 17,292 first-instance cases. In 2015, the average ALJ’s
salary was $159,196.65. Administrative Law Judge—Federal Salaries of 2015, FEDERALP AY.ORG,
https://www.federalpay.org/employees/occupations/administrative-law-judge/2015 [https://perma
.cc/B74T-GJL8]. That year, the SSA spent about 27% of ALJ salaries on fringe benefits. 2017 SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra, at 75 tbl.3.28, https://www.ssa.gov/budget/
FY17Files/2017LAE.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YKV-YAQ7] (showing that ALJ benefit and salary
expenses totaled $63,610,135 and $232,875,700, for a ratio of approximately 0.27). Thus the total
cost to the SSA in 2015 of court remands, measured in terms of ALJ productivity, is
52 × 1.27 × $159,156.65, which amounts to $10,510,705.17. Assuming that the cost of decision
writers and other support staff for the 52 ALJ-equivalents would amount to another 50% of this
figure yields a total SSA staff cost of 1.5 × $10,510,705.17, or $15,766,058.
With respect to judicial resources, the 19,222 disability cases terminated in the twelve months
ending June 30, 2015, amounted to 7% of civil terminations. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015, supra
note 29, at tbl.C-4, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c04jun15_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3LXS-S2J3] (counting cases in the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income rows).
Assuming these cases would require 7% of the work time of 630 district court judges (663
permanent authorized and 10 temporary authorized, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf [https://perma
.cc/HGL3-P8YQ], less 43 vacancies, Vacancy Summary for June 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies/2015/06/summary [https://perma.cc/EW3W-5KRK]), which is high since these cases
don’t go to trial or involve intensive pretrial wrangling, these cases account for the work time of
roughly 44 federal judges.
According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ FY 2017 Congressional Budget
Summary, filling an Article III judgeship costs $233,333.33, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET S UMMARY 24 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/fy_2017_federal_judiciary_congressional_budget_summary_0.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/9GCR-GWYU] (requesting $1.4 million to fill six judgeships), plus an additional
$140,000 for each of five staff members, see id. at 25 (requesting $4.2 million for thirty associated
staffers). The total including support staff is thus $933,333.33 per judge or $41,066,667 for the 44
additional federal judges. Adding that figure to the SSA staff cost of $15,766,058 calculated above
yields a total government staff cost of $56,832,725. In addition, the SSA must pay some of
claimants’ litigation costs under the EAJA; in 2015 these costs amounted to $38,132,381, Social
Security Administration Data for Equal Access to Justice Act Payments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/open/data/EAJA.xlsx [https://perma.cc/R4UM-GMV6], so the total
government staff cost and fee-shifting expenses come to $94,965,106. Government staff must be
paid out of tax revenues. Because taxes affect behavior, there are social costs of raising a dollar of
tax revenue. See JONATHAN GRUBER, P UBLIC F INANCE AND P UBLIC POLICY 566–75 (5th ed. 2016)
(cataloguing a variety of tax policies and their varied effects on behavior). An implication is that in
general, the overall social cost of having the government spend an additional dollar exceeds one
dollar. (This implication might not hold true during severe recessions, a special case.) To account
for this issue, we let β be the social cost of raising a dollar of tax revenue, so that under our
assumptions the total social cost of government staff work related to judicial review of disability
appeals is $94,965,106 × β. So far we have a total social value of $77,035,860 × 𝛼 and a total
social cost associated with government staffing equal to $94,965,106 × β. The difference will be
marginally positive if 𝛼 ≥ 1.24 × 𝛽, i.e., if the social value of transferring a dollar to persons truly
entitled to receive disability benefits is roughly 1.24 times the marginal cost of raising a dollar in
taxes. We think this assumption is reasonable, though of course the value of 𝛼 is fundamentally a
normative question.
There is also the question of how to account for benefits erroneously paid to those not actually
entitled to them under the law. Under our assumption above, benefits would have been wrongly
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3. The Opportunity Cost.—Another way to look at error correction is to
consider whether the resources it consumes could be spent in alternative
ways. On this view, the limitations of the error correction function lie not
only with the difficulties judges have identifying errors, nor only with the
harms that false positives cause, but rather with judicial review’s opportunity
cost. If invested in agency adjudication, the resources that judicial review
requires might lead to fewer errors made in the first instance.
Any adjudication system should prefer error avoidance to error
correction, all else equal. An acquittal or dismissal obviously compares
favorably to a conviction that later gets vacated on appeal. If the system’s
designer has $100 to spend, and if that sum can either avoid one error or
correct one error, the designer should invest in error avoidance rather than
error correction. Judicial review makes sense from this perspective only if
the $100 can buy more error correction than error avoidance.
For social security claims, the return on investment probably comes out
in favor of error avoidance rather than error correction. At a minimum,
resources expended on judicial review include salaries for the SSA litigators
who brief and argue cases, Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fees paid to

paid to 16.5% (one-quarter of 66%) of the 8,646 claimants who won remands in FY 2015, which
amounts to $25,678,620 in benefits wrongly paid. One approach would be to regard these paid-out
benefits as having a net social cost of $25,678,620 × β, since taxes must be raised to fund these
benefits. But that approach fails to recognize that (i) these benefits have some value to those who
receive them, and (ii) the well-being of such recipients has some social value. Presumably the social
value of transferring a dollar in disability benefits to those not actually entitled under the law is less
than the value of transferring a dollar to those who are eligible, in which case the appropriate value
of a dollar of such transfer is 𝛼𝜆, where 𝜆 < 1. Thus, the net social value impact of erroneous benefit
payments is $25,678,620 × (αλ − β), which is positive if 𝜆 is close enough to 1, negative
otherwise, and, finally, is never worse in social cost–benefit terms than −$25,678,620 × β. Our
final cost–benefit formula is $77,035,860 × 𝛼 − $94,965,106 × β + $25,678,620 × (αλ − β),
which, after some algebra, may be written as $120,643,726 × (𝛼 − β) − $43,607,866 × 𝛼 +
$25,678,620 × αλ. If we assume that 𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1.4, and 𝜆 = 0.5 (so that a dollar of disability
benefits paid to an ineligible person who is erroneously granted benefits on appeal has a social value
of 50 cents), then the net social value is a gain of $11 million. Raising the value of 𝜆 to 1 would
yield a net social value that is roughly $36 million. Reducing the value of 𝜆 to 0 instead yields a net
social value that is a loss of roughly $15 million. If we totally ignored the social costs related to
judicial review—i.e., set 𝛽 to 0—and assumed 𝜆 = 1, we would obtain a social value that is a gain
of about $205 million. If instead we kept the assumption of β = 1.4 but totally ignored the social
benefits—i.e., set α to 0—we would obtain a social value that is a loss of about $169 million. This
discussion shows that even with relatively extreme assumptions about the parameter values
necessary to measure the social costs and benefits of judicial review, the magnitude of the net social
gain or loss would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $100–$200 million. That might sound like
a lot of money, but it is a drop in the bucket in the context of the disability programs; SSDI alone
accounted for $147 billion in spending in 2015. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2016 OASDI TRUSTEES REPORT
tbl.II.B1 (2016), https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2016/II_B_cyoper.html#96807 [https://perma.cc/
U264-HYTH]. Thus, even our extreme assumptions yield net social gains or losses from judicial
review of less than a tenth of a percent of the disability programs’ overall spending. Our more
reasonable assumptions yield estimates whose magnitudes are rounding error in the budgetary
context.
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claimants’ lawyers when their clients prevail, 83 and the cost of federal judge
time. In FY 2015, these resources funded a system of judicial review that
corrected a maximum of about six-and-a-half errors per ALJ.84 The SSA paid
$38,132,381.48 in EAJA fees in FY 2015.85 This amount equals the salaries
of about 240 ALJs, or 18% of their total number. 86 If spent on ALJs instead,
this money alone could increase the ALJ corps by 18% and thereby enable
the SSA to lower per capita case completion goals without increasing the
backlog of undecided cases. If a lightened load led to even a modest
improvement in decisional accuracy, i.e., seven fewer errors per ALJ, 87 then
the resources spent on judicial review would yield fewer errors if redirected
to error avoidance. 88
This case for error avoidance rests on the assumption that the federal
courts currently correct only a modest number of errors. If the number rises,
the argument for an investment in error correction strengthens. In theory,
Congress can control this number by resetting jurisdictional requirements and
the federal courts’ standard of review. It thereby could adjust the flow of
cases to the federal courts. An endogeneity problem seems to exist. Whether
Congress should increase the flow of cases to the federal courts depends on
the value of the courts’ error correction function. But the value of error
correction depends on where Congress sets the dial to control the flow of
cases to the federal courts. Also, very importantly, claimants’ behavior might
be different earlier in the process if there were no judicial review. For
example, some claimants might not pursue appeals at earlier stages if they

83. On EAJA fees, see GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 55.
84. In FY 2013, the country’s 1,356 ALJs rendered 458,869 appealable decisions. SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., ANNUAL S TATISTICAL S UPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN tbl.2.F8 (2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/supplement14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7U5-JJE7]; Appeals to the AC as a Percentage of Appealable Hearing Level
Dispositions, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC01_RR_Appealable
_HO_Dispositions.html [https://perma.cc/23T9-3XER]. In FY 2015, the federal courts remanded
8,646 cases, or 6.4 remands per ALJ. Court Remands as a Percentage of New Court Cases Filed,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed
.html [https://perma.cc/B9FD-EM46]. For the purposes of this calculation, we assume that an ALJ
decision issued in 2013 will get reviewed, if at all, by a federal judge in 2015.
85. Social Security Administration Data for Equal Access to Justice Act Payments, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/open/data/EAJA.xlsx [https://perma.cc/R4UM-GMV6].
86. Administrative Law Judge—Federal Salaries of 2016, FEDERALP AY.ORG,
www.federalpay.org/employees/occupations/administrative-law-judge [https://perma.cc/WS9DEE4L].
87. On the relationship between quality and quantity, see GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16,
at 72–73.
88. The math comes out the same way for immigration adjudication. In 2015, the federal courts
of appeals decided 250 cases in favor of immigrants—about one per IJ. Guendelsberger, supra note
70, at 6. For information on the number of IJs during 2015, see Joshua Breisblatt, Despite
Immigration Judge Hiring, Court Backlogs Continue to Grow, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 27,
2016),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/07/27/despite-immigration-judge-hiring-courtbacklogs-continue-grow/ [https://perma.cc/3HGP-GLWT].

GELBACH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

5/17/2018 8:31 PM

Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication

1117

knew there was no possible appeal to the federal courts, and they might have
greater difficulty obtaining legal representation.
Other determinants of the bang for each buck invested in error
correction, however, are exogenous. They depend on immutable institutional
factors that constrain the federal courts’ overall capacity to review agency
decisions. Even under conditions that should prompt the most appeals, the
federal courts receive few relative to the agency’s caseload. In 2002, for
example, the U.S. Attorney General announced changes to BIA processes to
expedite agency review of IJ decisions.89 Many believe that these
“streamlining” changes degraded the BIA’s review considerably by reducing
the scrutiny it afforded IJ decisions. 90 BIA remands plummeted, 91 even as IJ
decisional quality earned scathing criticism. 92 Cases flooded the courts of
appeals,93 rising from 1,760 in 2001 to 12,349 in 2005. 94 But even at the
surge’s peak, only about 5% of IJ decisions produced a federal court appeal. 95
Attorney incentives are one such institutional factor that limits the
federal courts’ docket, regardless of where Congress sets the dial.
Immigration and social security lawyers prefer to litigate before agency
adjudicators rather than the federal courts. Disability and immigration cases
generate only modest fees, so social security and immigration specialists
often must have high volume practices. 96 For most lawyers, a federal court
appeal takes much more time than an appearance before an IJ or ALJ. 97
Immigration lawyers typically represent clients for a flat fee, 98 an
arrangement that should steer them toward less time intensive work (i.e.,
litigating in immigration court) than more (writing an appellate brief).
Lawyers who represent social security claimants likewise have a strong

89. John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 1994–96 (2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
(2017).
90. E.g., Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal Immigration
Appeals, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4–6 (2012).
91. See Legomsky, supra note 53, at 1668–70 (explaining the decline in pro-immigrant
decisions by BIA reviewers caused by the regulatory changes).
92. E.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005).
93. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1122–23 (2011).
94. Caplow, supra note 90, at 2–3.
95. In FY 2003, IJs decided 250,823 matters. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2006 S TATISTICAL YEAR BOOK C4 (2007). In 2005, immigrants filed
12,349 appeals from BIA decisions. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2005, at 15.
96. Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 985 (2015).
97. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 55 & n.321; see also John R.B. Palmer et al., Why
Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 88 (2005).
98. David Gialanella, The Skinny on Flat Fees, A.B.A. J., July 2008, at 26, 26.
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economic incentive to prefer agency work. 99 True, poor quality agency
adjudication in some hearing offices may deepen the pool of potentially good
appeals and make court work more attractive to lawyers. 100 But as long as
lawyers can earn more litigating before IJs or ALJs, the supply of lawyers
available to litigate federal court appeals in the areas where agency decisionmaking suffers may be insufficiently elastic to pick up the slack.
Attrition is perhaps an even more powerful institutional barrier to
federal court. The extended process of adjudication and review within the
agency can cause even those with meritorious appeals to give up before they
reach the federal courts. By the time she can file an appeal in federal court, a
disability benefits claimant may well have already spent more than 1,000
days pursuing her claim. 101 Although the time can vary considerably, an
immigrant’s case can easily languish for more than 1,000 days before an IJ
and the BIA complete their review. 102 Beyond the time involved, carrots or
sticks available to the agency can incentivize claimants or immigrants to
forego an appeal. Prolonged detention encourages immigrants to eschew
appeals and accept removal, presumably to end the misery of incarceration. 103
The SSA allows a previously denied claimant to file a new disability claim
based upon a worsening of her condition, but she must abandon any pending
appeal to do so. 104
Finally, the federal courts’ limited capacity to decide appeals in a
manner consistent with deliberative judicial practice may ultimately impose
an upper limit on how many cases they attract. As filings increase, judicial
processes may change to such an extent that they increasingly resemble the
fast, truncated adjudication that ALJs and IJs provide. 105 The Second and

99. See GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 55 n.321 (noting the greater time demands of
federal court appeals).
100. See Palmer et al., supra note 97, at 87–88 (explaining immigration lawyers’ loss of faith
and sense of injustice in BIA proceedings has improved their view of federal court appeals).
101. In FY 2015, the average processing time for a claim’s determination at the initial level was
114 days. Reconsideration took 113 days on average, and a claim languished for 480 days before
an ALJ’s decision. 2015–2017 SOC. SEC. ADMIN. ANN. PERFORMANCE REP. 26 (2017). Appeals
Council review took on average 386 days. Social Security Administration Appeals Council Requests
for Review Average Processing Time, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/open/data/AppealsCouncil-Avg-Proc-Time.html [https://perma.cc/WUH7-PRG2].
102. In 2015, the average case languished for 504 days before an IJ decided it. Immigration
Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/
court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/3JWK-GYUC]. We could not find 2015 data for the BIA. In 2012,
the BIA took an average of 485 days to decide an appeal filed by a nondetained immigrant. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., I-2013-001, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION
CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 43 (2012).
103. See BANKS MILLER ET AL., IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 131–32
(2015) (finding that detained immigrants “are much less likely to appeal”).
104. SSR 11-1p, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,309, 45,310 (July 28, 2011).
105. See GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 121–22 (describing the similarities in
decision-making structures between magistrate judges with high caseloads and agency
adjudicators); see also Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
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Ninth Circuits bore the brunt of the surge in immigration appeals after the
BIA streamlining changes. 106 Starting in 2002, the Ninth Circuit made
aggressive use of a case screening process that ultimately routed sixty percent
of immigration cases to staff attorneys for a quick workup, followed by a
brief oral presentation of each case to a screening panel of judges.107 These
judges, who typically did not review any materials in advance, decided 100–
150 cases based on these presentations over a 2–3 day period.108 The rate at
which immigrants prevailed appears to have fallen sharply between 2002 and
2006.109 Perhaps this assembly-line character dissuaded some appeals, as
lawyers came to identify less of a difference between agency and court
adjudication and perceived that increasing caseloads prompt courts to defer
more to the agency’s decisions.110
B.

The Regulatory and Critical Functions

The opportunity cost problem weakens the contribution that the error
correction function can make to the case for judicial review. But if courts not
only correct errors but also induce agency adjudicators to avoid more in the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL E THICS 3, 6 (2008) (describing the Second Circuit’s “nonargument calendar” for asylum cases, designed to handle the swell of immigration appeals).
106. Huang, supra note 93, at 1123–24.
107. Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and Their Effect on
Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 673 (2011).
108. Id. at 675; see also Michael Kagan et al., Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive
Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679, 702–05 (2014) (describing the Ninth Circuit screening system
as efficient but expressing concern with its “heavy reliance on staff attorneys rather than judges.”).
109. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provides termination data on “administrative
appeals” and does not isolate immigration cases more specifically. During the time period of the
surge, however, almost all of the change in the number of administrative appeals came from changes
to the number of immigration cases appealed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2004 12–13. The following table includes the percentage of administrative appeals the
Ninth Circuit either reversed or remanded out of the total number of administrative appeal
terminations:
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Reversal/Remand Rate
11%
9.3%
6.1%
6.6%
1.3%

Data come from Tables B-5 of the Judicial Business of the United States Courts for the years 2002–
2006. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts
[https://perma.cc/7GFM-CEPE].
110. See Huang, supra note 93, at 1111–12 (discussing the concern, as Judge John Gibbons put
it, that federal appellate courts’ “remarkable achievement in productivity has been attained at least
in part by the adoption of a posture of increased deference to the rulings of the courts we’re supposed
to be supervising”).

GELBACH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1120

5/17/2018 8:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:1097

first place, then its claim to cost effectiveness strengthens. The Mashaw
group suggested several ways by which court remands might play such a
regulative or critical function. Judicial review might have an in terrorem
effect on agency adjudication; 111 adjudicators might follow rules courts
fashion, or an agency might use information gleaned from court remands to
improve. As before, however, institutional determinants interfere with each
of these possibilities.
1. The In Terrorem Effect.—An ALJ or an IJ focused on numbers alone
has almost no reason to change her approach to decision-making just because
a federal judge might reverse her. Only 2%–3% of ALJ decisions denying
benefits produce a federal court remand. 112 The rate for IJs is even lower. 113
Another way to put it is to recall that federal courts remand roughly six cases
per ALJ per year, whereas ALJs adjudicate about 540 claims per year. 114 Of
course, agency adjudicators may vest outsized stock in the federal courts’
opinions of their work. When ALJs sued to challenge the expectation that
each decide 500–700 cases per year as a threat to their decisional
independence, for example, their complaint alleged that the slipshod work
this case completion goal required “injured” them because it “demeaned”
them “in the eyes of the federal judiciary.”115 To be taken seriously by
Article III judges as black-robed colleagues might matter more to agency
adjudicators than the odd remand here and there. Thus the threat of federal
court review might alter their decision-making.116
But federal judge criticism may just as plausibly encourage indifference
or hostility among agency adjudicators. For our report, we interviewed ALJs
who work in a hearing office that generates few remands and ALJs from a
hearing office that generates a lot of remands. The former reported much
more positive views of federal court decision-making and commented on the

111. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527 (1989) (“Judicial review serves as a powerful ex ante deterrent to
lawless or irrational agency behavior.”).
112. In FY 2013, ALJs issued 458,869 appealable decisions. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 84.
In FY 2015, the federal courts remanded 8,646 cases. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 81.
113. In 2015, the federal courts of appeals reversed the BIA 250 times. See supra note 88.
During FY 2013, immigration judges ordered removal in 95,838 removal proceedings. U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2
(2016). This figure does not account for the IJ decisions in asylum cases. So the chances of an
immigrant losing before an IJ, but eventually winning at a federal court of appeals, is less than 0.2%.
114. KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 6.
115. Complaint at 27, Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 2014 WL 789074 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(No. 13–cv–2925).
116. See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57,
71–72 (2008) (chronicling IJ complaints about threats to their esteem, including, for instance, the
“[f]ear that every decision or proceeding may trigger a ‘personalized’ and scathing published
criticism from the reviewing circuit court”).
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instructional value of court remands; indeed, these ALJs prepare and
circulate semi-annual memoranda summarizing all decisions from the district
court to which most of their cases go. 117 In contrast, ALJs in the high-remand
district complained that district judges have little understanding of or regard
for agency processes and expressed no appreciation for district court
feedback.118 The hearing offices there lack any sort of structured process that
would internalize learning from district court opinions. 119
2. The Precedential Effect.—Any in terrorem effect or lack thereof is
less significant if a court can impose precedent on the agency that forces it to
improve. This “precedential effect” has long attracted criticism on grounds
that generalist courts lack the requisite expertise and perspective to forge
useful legal changes to a complex regulatory regime. 120 We take as a given
the proposition that judges can craft wise opinions for these areas of law, a
proposition that is necessary but not sufficient for the precedential effect to
function. Regardless of this proposition, however, institutional features and
incentives can render the actual effect of precedent on agency decisionmaking questionable for high volume adjudication.
First, reviewing courts might not have a lot of precedent-setting
authority. This is clearly true when appeals first go to the federal district
courts, whose decisions agencies can ignore as nonprecedential. It can also
be true when courts of appeals review agency decisions, because an agency
can narrow the range of issues for which the court can issue binding
precedent. If an internal appellate tribunal issues an opinion that resolves an
unsettled interpretive issue, as the full BIA does routinely, 121 courts must
extend the decision deference if it meets certain criteria of
authoritativeness. 122 An agency can control the lawmaking terrain even more
completely by issuing legislative rules. 123

117. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 119–20.
118. Id. at 120.
119. Id. at 121.
120. See Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical
Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS L ITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND L AW 11,
19–20 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (comparing courts to agencies and highlighting generalist
courts’ lack of expertise and institutional restraint as disadvantages).
121. For all BIA precedent decisions, see Attorney General and BIA Precedent Decisions, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions [https://perma.cc/4P6X-MNDB].
122. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). But see Mahn v. Attorney Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that single-member BIA decisions do not warrant deference).
123. See, e.g., Revisions to the Rule Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.
Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (replacing the treating-physician rule by regulation); ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SSA DISABILITY BENEFITS PROGRAMS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF
THE TREATING P HYSICIAN R ULE 7–10 (2013) (describing Courts of Appeals’ creation of the
treating-physician rules and later acknowledgment that the contours of the rule could be altered by
the rulemaking process).
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Second, agencies can resist control by judicial precedent when it does
issue. Whether an agency can formally do so poses a complicated question,
although the answer is probably no. To a greater or lesser degree, a number
of agencies at one time or another have asserted a policy of
“nonacquiescence,” whereby they reserve the right to treat appellate case law
as nonbinding. 124 “Intercircuit nonacquiescence,” by which precedent binds
adjudicators only within a circuit’s boundaries, is routine. 125 This practice
necessarily weakens the power of judicial review to regulate agency
behavior,126 but no more than how circuit boundaries limit the force of any
precedent. The Fourth Circuit cannot compel ALJs in Pasadena to follow its
interpretation of the Social Security Act, but neither can the Fourth Circuit
demand that police officers in Pasadena honor its understanding of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has never ruled on “intracircuit
nonacquiescence,” the more problematic variant, whereby an agency denies
that appellate precedent binds its decision-making even within that circuit’s
boundaries. The lower federal courts have uniformly condemned the
practice,127 and neither the EOIR nor the SSA currently practices intracircuit
nonacquiescence, at least formally. 128
But acquiescence in judicial precedent does not necessarily happen
automatically within an agency. The agency typically has a process to digest
case law that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, can blunt the
precedent’s force. When a court of appeals issues a published opinion that
goes against the government in an immigration case, the EOIR’s Office of
General Counsel must coordinate the agency’s response with the DOJ’s
Office of Immigration Litigation and its own Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge.129 This “difficult” process130 presumably can delay the opinion’s
effect on IJ adjudication.
Something more than the unavoidable difficulty of bureaucratic
coordination seems afoot in the SSA. Since 1985, the agency has required all
ALJs within a circuit to follow that circuit’s precedent.131 But ALJs do not

124. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 692–718 (1989).
125. See, e.g., Matter of Singh, 25 I & N Dec. 670, 672 (B.I.A. 2012) (“We apply the law of
the circuit in cases arising in that jurisdiction, but we are not bound by a decision of a court of
appeals in a different circuit.”).
126. See ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 92–
93 (2009) (explaining the impact of nonacquiescence on the force of precedent).
127. E.g., Heartland Plymouth Court MI, LLC v. NLRB, 838 F.3d 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
Grant Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 204 F. Supp. 3d 68, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2016).
128. SSR 96-1p, 1996 WL 374182 (July 2, 1996); see Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 305
n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining who is bound by what precedent in immigration adjudication).
129. HUME, supra note 126, at 25.
130. Id.
131. MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER S TRESS: T HE S OCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 148 (1990).
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simply read opinions on their own and decide whether and how a court has
tweaked agency policy. The SSA instructs ALJs to ignore circuit decisions
until the agency has determined that the decision conflicts with agency
policy. Only then does the SSA issue an “acquiescence ruling” that directs
ALJs to comply. 132 This threshold can cloak a de facto policy of intracircuit
nonacquiescence. The agency can soft-pedal differences between precedent
and its own policy, insisting that no conflict exists, and thereby instruct ALJs
to ignore court decisions. In 2013, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that
ALJs must give “substantial weight” to the Veterans Administration’s
disability determination when a claimant with prior military service seeks
social security benefits.133 The social security ruling on the subject at the time
was that the VA’s determination “cannot be ignored and must be considered,”
an obligation that on its face seems weaker. 134 But the SSA never issued an
acquiescence ruling for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion.135 In fact, the agency
has issued just over eighty acquiescence rulings during the acquiescence
policy’s thirty-year history.136 After an initial flurry of acquiescence rulings
in the 1980s, when the policy began, the SSA’s pace has slowed markedly.
Since 1990, the SSA has issued only three acquiescence rulings for the
Second Circuit, for example, 137 and only three for the Seventh Circuit—a
court that generated at least ten published opinions adverse to the agency in
2015 alone.138
The tactics agencies can use to limit case law’s significance matter less
if agencies have no reason to resist regulation by precedent. But they do, for
several reasons. First, agencies may believe that generalist courts inexpertly
craft doctrine. Second, circuit-specific precedent can interfere with an
agency’s effort to administer a single national policy uniformly across the
country.139 An agency may believe that justice lies in the consistent treatment
132. SSR 96-1p, 1996 WL 374182 (July 2, 1996).
133. Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 669 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2012).
134. SSR 06-3p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,593-03 (Aug. 9, 2006), rescinded, Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5845 (Jan. 18, 2017).
135. In 2017, the SSA removed consideration of VA determinations entirely when it updated
its medical evidence rules. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82
Fed. Reg. at 5864, 5874 (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904).
136. All acquiescence rulings are available here: Acquiescence Rulings, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar-toc.html [https://perma.cc/2GA5-V4NS].
137. See Acquiescence Rulings: Second Circuit Court, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., www.ssa.gov/
OP_Home/rulings/ar/02/AR02toc.html [https://perma.cc/G265-Z25Z].
138. See id. The Seventh Circuit published the following cases adverse to the SSA: Hill v.
Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 863 (7th Cir. 2015); Alaura v. Colvin, 797 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 2015);
Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 2015); Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.
2015); Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2015); Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 656
(7th Cir. 2015); Voight v. Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 879–80 (7th Cir. 2015); Adaire v. Colvin, 778 F.3d
685, 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Hall v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015); Minnick v. Colvin, 775
F.3d 929, 939 (7th Cir. 2015).
139. Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1205–06 (1992).
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of regulated entities or beneficiaries, regardless of what courts say in different
parts of the country. 140 Also, the administration of a policy that splinters into
dozens of geographically determined variants, to be applied by hundreds of
different adjudicators, could prove impossibly difficult to administer. ALJs
and IJs have earned harsh criticism for decisional inconsistencies. 141 While
IJ disparities remain stubborn and notorious, 142 the SSA has undertaken
significant efforts to identify reasons for ALJ idiosyncrasy and to counteract
them.143 If the SSA instructed ALJs to abide by circuit and district precedent,
the agency would invite ALJs to draw their own judgment about governing
policy and complicate its efforts to get more than 1,000 adjudicators on
roughly the same policy-compliant page. For this reason,144 the SSA has
instructed ALJs and decision writers “not to consider any district court
decisions.”145
If an agency is recalcitrant, Congress can structure judicial review to
maximize courts’ power to create a precedential effect. As some have
proposed for social security disability claims litigation, Congress can require
that appeals go directly to circuit courts, not district courts, and it can steer
all appeals to a single circuit. 146 Doing so would undermine a key argument
for nonacquiescence: that different instructions from geographically
dispersed courts would flummox an agency’s effort to administer a single
national policy. But this arrangement would require either significantly less
litigation, a dramatic change to judicial standards for acceptable decisionmaking, or a huge increase in the size of the designated appellate court. When
Congress contemplated legislation to send all immigration appeals to the
Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit’s chief judge estimated that judicial time
for decision-making would plummet to an hour-and-a-half per case as a
result.147 Were Congress to centralize all of the disability appeals currently
pending before the regional circuits in the Federal Circuit, its caseload would
spike by 25%, assuming no changes in claimant behavior; if all disability
cases pending before the district courts went to the Federal Circuit, the latter
140. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 74–75.
141. Id. at 84–85 & n.444.
142. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-72, ASYLUM: VARIATIONS EXIST IN
OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 2, 17 (2016).
143. Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by
the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of the United
States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1606
(2015).
144. Memorandum from Debra Bice, Chief Admin. Law Judge, to All Administrative Law
Judges and All Senior Attorneys 2 (Jan. 11, 2013) (on file with authors); see also GELBACH &
MARCUS, supra note 16, at 76 (quoting the Bice memorandum).
145. Bice, supra note 144, at 1–2.
146. E.g., Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for
Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 512–17 (1990).
147. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Paul R. Michel, C.J.).
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would have to grow by dozens of judges to keep its caseload at manageable
levels.148
3. Feedback.—Whether binding or not, court decisions can serve as a
valuable source of feedback and thereby discharge a critical function. An
agency can always examine its wins and losses in court to look for ways to
improve. But several institutional contrasts between courts and agencies may
reduce agency incentives to do so.
One involves institutional goals. On a superficial level, agencies and
courts share the same goal: the accurate and efficient implementation of the
relevant regulatory regime. On another, however, these goals diverge.
Agencies attempt to meet standards for decisional quality, but quantity—case
completion goals, production quotas, and so forth—matter just as much, if
not more, in measures of agency performance. 149 Quality conflicts with
quantity, for obvious reasons. 150 ALJs surely could generate better decisions
with half as many claims to adjudicate, but claimants would then wait twice
as long for a hearing. The SSA is legitimately concerned with the injustice of

148. In FY 2014, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims decided about 175 petitions and
appeals on the merits per “active judge.” 2014 U.S. CT. APP. VETERAN CLAIMS ANN. REP. 5,
www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014AnnualReport06MAR15FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y6ZD-R8GP]. A court of appeals handling all 20,000 social security cases presently filed in the
district courts would have to have 114 judges dedicated just to this litigation to have an equivalent
caseload. The CAVC has attracted criticism for its backlog. E.g., Jerry Markon, Veterans Court
Faces Backlog that Continues to Grow, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2011), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/veterans-court-faces-backlog-that-continues-to-grow/2011/04/15/
AFFaavRE_story.html?utm_term=.df2fbbcc9128 [https://perma.cc/99B5-44BS].
149. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (arguing that agencies “tend to overproduce
on the goals that are complements and the goals that are easily measured”); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., MISPLACED PRIORITIES: HOW THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SACRIFICED QUALITY FOR QUANTITY IN THE D ISABILITY
DETERMINATION PROCESS 49 (2014) (asserting that “many of [the agency’s] failings are attributable
to the agency’s development of a factory-like production process that ignores the quality of ALJ
decisions”).
150. Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2015); Stephen W.
Gilliland & Ronald S. Landis, Quality and Quantity Goals in a Complex Decision Task: Strategies
and Outcomes, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 672, 680 (1992).
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a claim’s being unreasonably delayed. 151 It faces constant and enduring
scrutiny for its claims backlog,152 as does the EOIR.153
Agencies have the complex task of successfully managing the tradeoff
between quantity and quality. Typically, the federal courts do not shoulder
the same obligation to generate large numbers of decisions quickly. 154
Agencies constantly monitor adjudicator productivity and evaluate
performance in terms of it. 155 The institutional culture of the federal judiciary
would not permit the same sort of pressure on individual judges. 156 Moreover,
the federal courts do not endure the same legislative and public scrutiny for
their pace of decision-making that agencies routinely confront. Federal
judges can therefore render particularized justice tailored to the
circumstances of an individual case without significant regard for production
quotas. Differences in resources available to decide cases exacerbate the
significance of these contrasting goals. An ALJ deciding up to fifty cases per
month has a fundamentally different job than a federal judge and her clerk,
who can deliberate on a case for a week.157
An agency adjudicator might treat judicial feedback as unhelpful if it
does not account for her need to produce decisions quickly under severe
resource constraints. An example involves the enforcement of subpoenas
ALJs issue to medical providers for relevant records. 158 To some federal

151. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing “the Secretary’s policy
of setting a minimum number of dispositions an ALJ must decide in a month” and agreeing “with
the district court that reasonable efforts to increase the production levels of ALJs are not an
infringement of decisional independence”).
152. E.g., David A. Fahrenthold, At Social Security Office with a Million-Person Backlog,
There’s a New Chief, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federaleye/wp/2015/07/23/at-social-security-office-with-a-million-person-backlog-theres-a-newchief/?utm_term=.bf7210f69698 [https://perma.cc/Y7QK-2LND].
153. E.g., Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts, Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to
Buckle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-immigrationcourts-where-cases-stall-for-years-begin-to-buckle.html [https://perma.cc/RPC8-P3XW].
154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES T HINK 140–41 (2008) (commenting on district
judges’ sensitivity to delays in deciding motions but noting that there is no sanction for delays). But
see Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts and Expanding
Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & C LARK L. REV. 473, 476 (2009) (observing
that about one-third of Ninth Circuit cases get decided by a “screening panel” of judges that spend
four to nine minutes on each after a workup by a staff attorney).
155. E.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 41 (describing an online tracking program
called “How MI Doing” that allows an ALJ to see the number of cases she has decided and her
remand rate).
156. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 516–17 (1990)
(commenting on federal judges’ aversion, based partly on their “self-image,” to interference with
their decision-making processes).
157. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 74.
158. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d)(1), 416.1450(d)(1) (2017); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HEARINGS,
APPEALS, AND LITIGATION L AW MANUAL I-2-5-78 [hereinafter H ALLEX], https://www.ssa.gov/
OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-5-78.html [https://perma.cc/XF4A-GJML].
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courts, especially in pro se cases, the mere issuance of a subpoena does not
discharge the ALJ’s obligation to “develop” the record159 when the person or
entity being subpoenaed does not respond. 160 An ALJ who seeks a subpoena’s
enforcement, however, must trigger a cumbersome, time-intensive
process.161 The SSA may follow through on a particular court remand
requiring a subpoena’s enforcement. But the agency is not likely to act on
this feedback more generally and institutionalize a subpoena enforcement
policy, given the demands of its caseload. 162
A second institutional difference might affect the filter through which
adjudicators view court feedback, countering its potency. Agency
adjudicators might feel obliged to honor aggregate-level, agency-wide policy
goals that courts do not countenance. 163 A need to “protect the fund” and the
overall health of the social security program might influence ALJ decisionmaking in individual cases. 164 Observers have long commented on the
uncomfortable placement of IJs within the DOJ, suggesting that this
institutional arrangement may skew decision-making in favor of strict
enforcement.165 Federal judges face no such aggregate-level pressure for the
successful administration of a complex regulatory regime.
Two other institutional differences can also undermine guidance derived
from judicial opinions. The first is the baseline problem described above. A

159. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)–(e), 416.912(d)–(e).
160. E.g., Brandow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:05–CV–09171 NPMVEB, 2009 WL
2971543, at *5 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009); Suriel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 05-1218,
2006 WL 2516429, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006); Sanchez v. Barnhart, 329 F. Supp. 2d 445,
450–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). But see Friedman v. Astrue, No. 07 Civ. 3651, 2008 WL 3861211, at *8–
9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2008) (abiding by a Second Circuit holding that an “ALJ’s decision to enforce
a subpoena on an unresponsive party is discretionary”); Serrano v. Barnhart, No. 02 Civ. 6372, 2005
WL 3018256, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2005) (finding that a mandate to enforce a subpoena would
be a “tremendous and undue burden” on an ALJ).
161. HALLEX, supra note 158, at I-2-5-82, https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-582.html [https://perma.cc/4N4E-ZRW3]; see also Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.
1998) (expressing concerns over “the financial and administrative burdens of processing disability
claims” that a rule requiring the SSA to subpoena treating physicians at the claimant’s behest would
entail).
162. See GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 19–21 (juxtaposing the difficulties of the
subpoena process with ALJs’ institutional “just in time” approach towards case review).
163. Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for Artisans in the
Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1992).
164. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 78–79; see also D. Randall Frye, Statement of the
Association of Administrative Law Judges, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social
Security, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 35, 42–43 (2013) (June 27, 2012) (stating that
“having the judge defend the Trust Fund as well as the claimant’s interest . . . places the judge in an
untenable situation”).
165. E.g., U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 178 (1997) (advocating that citizenship and immigration adjudications be
moved from the DOJ to the State Department); AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
RESOLUTION 114F, at 4–5 (2010) (describing criticism of the placement of immigration
adjudication under the purview of the DOJ and advocating for fundamental “restructuring”).
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nitpicky remand of a clearly meritless claim might lead the ALJ to discount
the district court’s order, and perhaps future ones, as uninformed. Second,
the agency might explicitly discourage its adjudicators from considering
court remands as a source of feedback, concerned that doing so might create
discrepancies in adjudicators’ understandings of policy-compliant decisionmaking.
Whatever the reason, the SSA presently does little as an agency 166 to
mine district court remand decisions for instruction. An ALJ who gets
remanded will see the decision, but the decision writer who drafted it will
not.167 Neither does the Appeals Council analyst nor the appellate
adjudicator. The EOIR has no mechanism in place to ensure that staff
attorneys involved in a decision that gets remanded see the court opinion and
learn from it.168
***
The foregoing dwells on the many institutional impediments that
interfere with judicial review’s corrective, regulative, and critical functions.
The story may not be quite so bleak. In particular instances courts may
discharge one or more of the functions more successfully. The body of
immigration law that IJs administer, for instance, owes a good deal to federal
circuit precedent. Also, the case for judicial review should not depend upon
the justificatory force of any single function in isolation but rather the
cumulative contributions that courts can make. Courts may not correct errors
more efficiently than adjudicators can avoid them, but if they can rectify
some mistakes and exert some regulative influence, however limited, then
perhaps the case for judicial review of high volume agency adjudication
strengthens.
Those who have studied high volume agency adjudication most closely
remain unconvinced. The Mashaw group favored the replacement of
Article III review of ALJ decision-making with a specialized social security
court,169 a recommendation seconded by distinguished commentators. 170
When Congress caved to judicial pressure and created judicial review for
veterans benefits adjudication in 1988, it opted for a specialized Article I
court.171 A proposal to jettison review of IJ decisions by the regional courts

166. ALJs on their own in some instances have created organized methods of deriving feedback
from district court decisions. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 119–20.
167. Id. at 174–75.
168. Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There From Here: Managing Judicial Review of
Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 427 (2007).
169. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 146–50.
170. Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 15, at 776, 781–82.
171. Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. REV.
388, 396 (2011).
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of appeals gained traction in Congress in the mid-2000s.172 Many clearly
continue to believe that whatever benefits Article III review brings to high
volume agency adjudication, they fall short of justifying it.
III. Problem-Oriented Oversight
Judgments about judicial review’s wisdom are incomplete because
existing accounts of its role supervising high volume agency adjudication
have overlooked a key function courts can perform. This function has
something important to do with an interesting dynamic apparent in the case
law this litigation generates. Often boring and repetitive, appeals typically
yield cookie-cutter opinions of little significance. 173 Not infrequently,
however, judges break this tedium with extraordinary commentary on
patterns or trends they have observed. Identifying a set of ALJ decisions he
found troubling, for example, a magistrate judge recently described some
social security proceedings as “border[ing] on madness.”174 In a separate
opinion released the same day, he denounced ALJ decisions as “littered with
recurring issues” and lampooned social security appeals as “Groundhog
Day.”175 Perhaps such statements, which are legion in immigration
opinions176 and not uncommon in social security cases, 177 are little more than
outbursts of judicial frustration. But Article III judges tend to keep their
powder pretty dry, so we interpret this sort of commentary as purposeful.
From time to time, judges try to influence agency decision-making
through means beyond the correction of discrete errors in individual cases or
the issuance of binding precedent. A comparison provides some insight into
what courts might be up to. Congress has a lot of tools at its disposal to
influence agency behavior. 178 One important one is a form of oversight, by
which legislators assemble information on an agency, then comment publicly

172. E.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
173. E.g., MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15, at 140.
174. Wallace v. Colvin, 193 F. Supp. 3d 939, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
175. Booth v. Colvin, No. 14 CV 50347, 2016 WL 3476700, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2016).
176. See Legomsky, supra note 53, at 1645 (referring to “the unprecedented scathing criticisms
that so many U.S. courts of appeals have leveled at EOIR”).
177. E.g., Hughes v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 2013) (admonishing the SSA and DOJ
to “do better than they did in this case”); Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004)
(reiterating the demand for more than standard boilerplate language because it “fails to inform [the
court] in a meaningful, reviewable way of the specific evidence the ALJ considered in determining
that claimant’s complaints were not credible”); Batista v. Colvin, Civ. No. 13-4185, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80576, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2014) (demanding that “[j]ust once, [the court] would like
to see an ALJ write” specific reasons for rejecting a plaintiff’s credibility); Freismuth v. Astrue, 920
F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (describing the SSA Commissioner’s brief that didn’t include
a citation to case law as “insulting” to the court because the “Commissioner’s counsel can neither
appropriately screen [ALJ decisions] nor adequately brief them”).
178. Jack M. Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN D IEGO L. REV. 61, 69–70
(2006).

GELBACH.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1130

5/17/2018 8:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:1097

and critically on its performance. 179 Although in theory backed by the threat
of a budget cut or some other legislative sanction, these congressional
interventions can derive force simply from the informal pressure they
generate.180 We argue that courts attempt something similar, what we call
“problem-oriented oversight,” when they decide certain appeals.
Courts engage in problem-oriented oversight when they identify and
respond to “problems,” defined either as flawed administrations of policy by
the agency, or as the agency’s nonresponse to an entrenched decision-making
pathology. This Part distinguishes problem-oriented oversight from existing
models of agency oversight and explains how courts engage in the task.
Part IV examines the institutional factors that determine whether this
function can succeed.
A.

Models of Agency Oversight

The notion that judicial review functions as a type of agency oversight
is hardly novel.181 What exactly this oversight is and how courts conduct it in
the context of high volume agency adjudication, however, have attracted little
examination.
We begin with what Mariano-Florentino Cuellar aptly calls an
“incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of the
bureaucracy,”182 a subject that has garnered more study than court-based
oversight. This canonical framework describes oversight in terms of two
models.183 When Congress engages in “police patrol oversight,” it surveys a
large number of agency decisions or actions, selected at random, to determine
if the agency is functioning properly.184 Like a police officer cruising a
neighborhood, this oversight happens when, “at its own initiative, Congress
examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting
and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its surveillance,
discouraging such violations.”185 Police patrol oversight is proactive and
often regular and ongoing. 186 Examples include making an agency submit
annual reports to Congress, obliging agency officials to appear at committee

179. Id. at 122–23, 125.
180. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “the Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. REV.
765, 784–85 (2009).
181. See, e.g., David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J.
723, 747–78 (2009) (arguing courts make efficient and effective monitors of government conduct).
182. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227,
297 (2006).
183. Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–66 (1984).
184. Id. at 166.
185. Id.
186. LINDA L. FOWLER, WATCHDOGS ON THE HILL: THE DECLINE OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 134–35, 139 (2015).
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hearings in connection with an annual budget request, and submitting an
agency to examination by the Government Accountability Office. 187
“Fire alarm oversight,” the second model, responds to institutional
constraints, including high costs and inconstant legislator attention, that in
theory limit the efficacy of police patrols. 188 Rather than itself gather and sift
through large amounts of information about agency performance to find
possible problems, “Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and
informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest
groups to examine administrative decisions . . . , to charge executive agencies
with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies,
courts, and Congress itself.” 189 Such mechanisms are “fire alarms” that third
parties can ring and thereby direct oversight attention to agency misconduct.
Thus, this oversight is episodic and reactive.
A recent disability benefits scandal nicely illustrates fire alarm
oversight. David Daugherty, an ALJ in Huntington, West Virginia, granted
benefits in 1,280 of the 1,284 cases he decided in FY 2010. 190 This was the
sixth year in a row in which Daugherty had decided more than 1,000 cases; 191
it came amidst a stunning growth in the nation’s disability rolls, and in a year
when ALJs granted benefits in more than 70% of cases they decided on the
merits.192 Protected by a statutory safe harbor, 193 a prototypical fire alarm,194
a whistleblower contacted the Wall Street Journal to bring Daugherty’s
practice of rubber-stamping disability benefits claims to light. 195 The article

187. Beerman, supra note 165, at 66–67.
188. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 183, at 168.
189. Id. at 166.
190. Damian Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge Has Trouble Saying “No”, WALL S TREET J.
(May 19, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487046819045763191636059
18524 [https://perma.cc/D5XU-4KM2].
191. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG.,
HOW SOME LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALS ABUSED SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRY’S MOST VULNERABLE : A C ASE STUDY OF THE CONN
LAW F IRM 34 (2013).
192. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., ASPECTS OF DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS 12 (2012); CTR. ON BUDGET & P OLICY PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK: SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY INSURANCE 6–7 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-2114socsec-chartbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C8B-T7SK].
193. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012).
194. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1097, 1143 (2017).
195. Paletta, supra note 190; see also Press Release, Soc. Sec. Admin., Office of the Inspector
Gen., Former SSA Chief Administrative Law Judge Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Retaliate
Against Informant (June 13, 2016), https://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-investigations/investigations/
june13-andrus-guilty-plea [https://perma.cc/PAY6-VLVR] (describing the prosecution of the
former chief ALJ in the Huntington office for conspiring to retaliate against an SSA employee who
was an informant for federal investigators).
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prompted several congressional hearings 196 and at least two committee
reports.197 What emerged was criticism that the SSA, focused on casecompletion goals above all else, turned a blind eye to ALJs “paying down” a
huge backlog of claims. 198 Daugherty eventually pleaded guilty to felony
charges, admitting that he took kickbacks from a local social security lawyer
who received fees when Daugherty granted his clients’ claims.199 Although
the SSA denied the blind-eye charge, it made significant changes, at least
partially in response to congressional scrutiny. 200 The ALJ claim allowance
rate declined sharply, to 48%, by 2013.201
Although developed to describe versions of Congressional oversight,
the police patrol and fire alarm models have come to serve as descriptions of
how a range of overseers, including courts, can supervise agencies. 202 Judicial
review has traditionally been treated as a component in a fire alarm system,
with courts either as the oversight institution itself, or with courts serving as
a forum where aggrieved third parties can ring a fire alarm and thereby trigger
oversight.203

196. See, e.g., Social Security Administration Oversight: Examining the Integrity of the
Disability Determination Appeals Process: Hearing Before the H. Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, 113th Cong. 29 (2014) (statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. On
the Judiciary) (indicating Congress first learned of the matter from the Wall Street Journal). See
generally Social Security Disability Benefits: Did a Group of Judges, Doctors, and Lawyers Abuse
Programs for the Country’s Most Vulnerable?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on SSDI Abuse] (repeatedly
discussing the Wall Street Journal article).
197. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 149, at 6 & n.6; STAFF
OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 191, at 6.
198. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 149, at 5–7
(identifying the SSA’s emphasis on quantity over quality in ALJ decisions); Stephen Olemacher,
Judges Tell Lawmakers They Are Urged to Approve Social Security Disability Claims, WASH. POST
(June 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-tell-lawmakers-they-are-urgedto-approve-social-security-disability-claims/2013/06/27/ea990a7e-df66-11e2-b2d4ea6d8f477a01_story.html?utm_term=.3bccda0a508a [https://perma.cc/7VUA-C7QG] (reporting
ALJs describing a system where judges were urged to grant claims for the sake of reducing the case
backlog).
199. Stephen Dinan, Judge Pleads Guilty in Massive Social Security Fraud Case, WASH. T IMES
(May 14, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/14/david-b-daugherty-pleadsguilty-in-massive-social-/ [https://perma.cc/H8AR-77QH].
200. Social Security Disability Benefits: Did a Group of Judges, Doctors, and Lawyers Abuse
Programs for the Country’s Most Vulnerable?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 127 (2013) (statement of Debra Bice, Chief ALJ, Social
Security Administration).
201. 2017 SOC. SEC. ADMIN. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 74, at 144.
202. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1172 (2009).
203. Id.; Law, supra note 181, at 747–48.
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The Limits of the Fire Alarm Model

When Richard Posner castigated the “Immigration Court” as “the least
competent federal agency” in a 2016 opinion, 204 perhaps he meant his harsh
words as an attempt at fire alarm oversight. A third party, the immigrant
facing removal, brought an alleged agency problem to a court and got Judge
Posner to respond vociferously. But for several reasons the fire alarm model
imperfectly describes what courts do. First, courts review large numbers of
cases, most of which were either acceptably decided or at worst marred by
random error. Fire alarm oversight is premised on the notion that third parties
screen agency decisions for the overseer, finding agency flaws for a court, or
a legislature motivated by a court, to fix. If this is so, the mechanism would
seem to fit high volume agency adjudication poorly. Indeed, judicial
oversight has some of the markings of a police patrol. It is regular and
ongoing, and it involves large numbers of unremarkable agency decisions.
The ordinariness of judicial review relates to a second reason why it
does not really serve as a form of fire alarm oversight in the context of high
volume agency adjudication. To the extent that fire alarm oversight depends
upon attracting the attention of Congress or the public at large, the regularity
of court involvement interferes with the objective. We are unaware of any
congressional hearings held during the past decade that court decisions in
social security cases prompted, even as federal judges have fulminated about
poor quality SSA decision-making.205 If fire alarms ring all the time, then
they seem less like alarms and more like background noise.
Finally, especially for the sorts of problems that courts are uniquely
well-positioned to identify and to try to correct, effective judicial oversight
of high volume agency adjudication is often not reactive and incident-driven,
but requires judicial proactivity and extended engagement over time.
Sometimes an appeal from a random ALJ or IJ order sounds the alarm over
a large-scale matter whose significance a court immediately appreciates.
When the BIA determined that someone seeking asylum based on her
experience with female genital mutilation did not establish a risk of future
persecution because the mutilation happened in the past,206 the Second
Circuit swiftly rebuked the agency for a “significant error[] in the application
of its own regulatory framework.”207 But an array of smaller bore but

204. Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., dissenting).
205. We searched for congressional publications in the Proquest Congressional database using
the search terms “federal /s (court or judge),” “social security,” “disability /s benefits,” and
“Posner,” limiting our search to 2007 to 2017. The search yielded nothing suggesting a hearing or
other oversight activity prompted by federal court opinions. “Posner” refers to Richard Posner.
Because of Judge Posner’s stature and because of his high-profile criticism of disability benefits
adjudication, his name should appear in oversight materials prompted by judicial criticism, had there
been any.
206. In re A-T-, 24 I & N Dec. 296, 303–04 (B.I.A. 2007).
207. Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2008).
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nonetheless important pathologies, such as problematic behavior by a single
adjudicator or flaws in an agency’s internal manual, can plague agency
decision-making. Judicial awareness of these problems might sharpen only
over time, and only as courts engage repeatedly with them.
C.

Problem-Oriented Oversight Through Judicial Review
Judicial review of high volume agency adjudication does not fit the
police patrol model either. The process relies upon third parties to identify
and complain about flawed agency decision-making, which is a defining
feature of fire alarm oversight. Courts do not proactively seek out adjudicator
orders to review, as an auditor randomly sampling decisions to get an overall
sense of the agency’s performance might. 208 But an adjusted version of the
police patrol metaphor works pretty well to describe the oversight role that
courts can assume. “Problem-oriented policing”
posits that police should focus more attention on problems, as opposed
to incidents . . . . Problems are defined either as collections of
incidents related in some way (if they occur at the same location, for
example) or as underlying conditions that give rise to incidents,
crimes, disorder, and other substantive community issues . . . .209
Whereas “incident-driven,” reactive policing focuses on the resolution
of discrete incidents, 210 problem-oriented policing treats each incident as a
datum for the identification of underlying factors that create crime and for
the best possible responses. 211 Identifying underlying causes, not clearing
arrests, is the goal. 212
Table 2 describes definitional characteristics of fire alarm, police patrol,
and problem-oriented oversight.

208. See, e.g., Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the
government’s inability to appeal as well as caution by claimants’ lawyers in appealing make it
impossible for courts to assess the error rate of administrative adjudications).
209. Gary Cordner & Elizabeth Perkins Biebel, Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice, 4
CRIMINOLOGY & P UB. POL’Y 155, 156 (2005).
210. ANTHONY A. BRAGA, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING AND CRIME PREVENTION 9 (2d ed.
2010).
211. Id. at 10, 15.
212. Cordner & Biebel, supra note 209, at 156, 158.
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Table 2. Models of Oversight Compared

Definitional
Characteristic

Fire Alarm
Oversight

Police Patrol
Oversight

Problem-Oriented
Oversight

Initiator

Third Party

Oversight
Institution

Third Party

Regularity of
Oversight

Episodic

Regular/Ongoing

Regular/Ongoing

Goal of Oversight

Problem
Identification and
Response

Overall
Assessment of
Performance

Problem
Identification and
Response

Audit of
Numerous
Agency Decisions

Discrete Response
to Incident or to
Pattern Gleaned
from Review of
Numerous Agency
Decisions

Mode of Oversight

Discrete Response
to Incident

When courts engage in problem-oriented oversight, they treat appeals as
indicators of potential problems. Of course, many appeals simply result from
adjudicator “error,” a word we use as a term of art. But “problems,” defined
as systematic underlying pathologies in internal agency administration that
afflict adjudication, can lurk among these flaws. The claimant or immigrant
bringing the problem to a court’s attention may not know whether his case
presents an error or a problem. Precisely the ordinariness of judicial review,
or the continuing, routine engagement of courts with the agency’s decisionmaking, enables courts to distinguish problems from errors and respond
appropriately.
1. Errors.—Agency adjudicators can produce flawed decisions for
several reasons. Sometimes they simply err. The agency has adopted an
acceptable interpretation of governing law. An acceptably competent
adjudicator understands and applies this interpretation. But in the odd case,
the adjudicator, as a mere mortal, happens to make an error. Perhaps amidst
the six hundred pages of medical records in the claimant’s file, an ALJ
overlooks the physician’s note that confirms a claimant’s alleged
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symptoms.213 Perhaps the IJ wrongly but not unreasonably treats a particular
conviction as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” which requires the
immigrant’s deportation.214
When an agency adjudicator errs, a reviewing court can correct the error
but accomplish little more. By our definition of error, no underlying problem
exists to address. Presumably, the ALJ would have decided the case better
had she caught the physician’s note, and the case proceeded to federal court
only because her mistake slipped past personnel at the Appeals Council. As
we have already argued, this error correction offers a marginal justification
for judicial review of high volume agency adjudication. To return to the
metaphor, the error-correction function is like arresting a random lawbreaker,
not ferreting out what underlying factors foster criminal activity.
2. Problems.—Flawed decisions result from problems, not mere error,
in one of two situations. First, the agency may have adopted a bad policy.
Second, the agency cannot or will not fix an entrenched decision-making
pathology.
a. Bad Policy.—Agencies can adopt bad policies. The BIA’s erstwhile
stance on female genital mutilation is an example. An instruction in a
guidance document or manual that conflicts with governing precedent is
another, albeit one more likely to fly under the radar and less likely to trigger
a loud fire alarm. 215 However fine the mesh in its net, an internal appeals
tribunal would never catch flawed adjudicator decisions when the
shortcomings result from a bad policy because the tribunal has to abide by
the policy as well. Thus, it would uphold an adjudicator’s decision following
the policy as correct.
b. Entrenched Pathology.—A second type of problem results when the
agency is unwilling or unable to correct an entrenched pathology that afflicts
adjudicator decision-making. The threat of deliberate indifference to certain
strains of adjudicator dysfunction lurks in the institutional DNA of agencies
tasked with large numbers of claims or decisions to make. The number of
cases decided is an easily administrable performance metric, but one that can
reward decision-making that fares poorly by the harder-to-use measure of
decisional quality. 216 If an agency sets production targets or quotas, as the
EOIR and SSA do, it may find the temptation to ignore warning signs of
213. See Oversight of Rising Social Security Disability Claims and the Role of Administrative
Law Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements of the
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn)
(“The average case has over 600 pages in it.”).
214. E.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 200 (4th Cir. 2014).
215. For examples of flawed guidance documents, see Harris v. Astrue, No. 3:09CV00260,
2010 WL 3909495, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2010); Palaschak v. Astrue, No. 08–CV–1172, 2009
WL 6315324, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009).
216. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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serious adjudicator dysfunction overwhelming. 217 Judge Daugherty, the
Huntington ALJ, had a shockingly high allowance rate and decided
astonishing numbers of cases. Together with the $600 million in lifetime
benefits he awarded, 218 these dubious achievements should have raised red
flags in SSA headquarters.219 Instead, notwithstanding a well-documented
morale and management problem in the Huntington hearing office, the SSA,
under pressure to keep a growing backlog at bay, 220 transferred 1,186 aged
cases there between 2006 and 2011. 221 During this time, the SSA based its
evaluations of ALJ performance solely on number of cases decided, with no
adjustment for decisional quality. 222
The Huntington episode did not trigger judicial review because the SSA
generally cannot appeal when an ALJ grants benefits. But an agency focused

217. See Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of OverPrescribing Goal Setting 7–8 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-083, 2009),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-083.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ACZ-3YAA]
(“Goals that are easier to achieve and measure (such as quantity) may be given more attention than
other goals (such as quality) in a multi-goal situation.”).
218. Devlin Barrett & Damian Paletta, Three Indicted for Alleged Social Security Fraud
Scheme in Kentucky, WALL S TREET J. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/three-indictedfor-alleged-social-security-fraud-scheme-in-kentucky-1459867962
[https://perma.cc/YGG6AB4Z].
219. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 149, at 6.
220. For an indication of congressional interest in the disability claims backlog during the mid2000s, see Improve the Responsiveness and Oversight of the Hearings Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://web.archive.org/web/20160809001205/https://oig.ssa.gov/auditsand-investigations/top-ssa-management-issues/social-security-disability-hearings-backlog?page=6
[https://perma.cc/G6LJ-5E4K] (flagging the hearing backlog as a “Top SSA Management Issue”
and listing dozens of reports on the topic, including nearly 40 from 2005 to 2010).
221. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 191, at
20–22.
222. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., SYSTEMIC WASTE
AND ABUSE AT THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 32–34 (2014). Another episode involved
an ALJ in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, who granted benefits to 2,285 people in 2007 alone. Although
others in the agency criticized this ALJ, the agency’s chief ALJ praised him for “putting in
incredible hours” and insisted that the ALJ “feels very committed to public service.” Brent Walth
& Bryan Denson, Paying Out Billions, One Judge Attracts Criticism, OREGONIAN (Dec. 30, 2008),
http://www.oregonlive.com/special/index.ssf/2008/12/paying_out_billions_one_judge.html [https
://perma.cc/2U9R-KWLW]. The ALJ continued in his role as Hearing Office Chief Administrative
Law Judge for a year and a half after his decision pattern made news. See Social Security
Administration Oversight: Examining the Integrity of the Disability Determination Appeals
Process: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 30 (2014)
(statement of Charles Bridges, Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration) (stating
that he continued in that role until June 2010, eighteen months after the Oregonian piece). He was
removed from his leadership role in June 2010 because of how he administered the hearing office,
but not explicitly because of his decision pattern. Appellees’ Supplemental Appendix at SA00166,
Bridges v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 607 F. App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1580). Only in 2014 did
the agency seem to take action to address the ALJ’s decision patterns. See Bridges v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 607 F. App’x 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing a determination made after FY 2013
that the ALJ’s decisions “did not comply with SSA standards” and subsequent action taken by his
supervisors).
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on numbers might just as well turn a blind eye to poor-quality decisionmaking that harms claimants or immigrants if the adjudicator decides a lot of
cases.223 The Atlanta immigration court decides cases in immigrants’ favor
at astonishingly low rates. 224 Persistent criticism for perceived bias against
immigrants hounds Atlanta IJs, 225 and at least one Atlanta IJ has attracted a
disproportionate number of formal complaints. 226 But, as an observer
speculates, the EOIR has not taken significant steps at reform, perhaps
because the Atlanta immigration court decides large numbers of cases. 227
Entrenched pathologies might persist for reasons other than deliberate
indifference, but ones equally baked into the institutional structure of agency
adjudication. Agency adjudicators often enjoy employment protections that
amount to a minor league version of life tenure. 228 The SSA cannot take
disciplinary action against an ALJ based solely on how the ALJ decides
223. A Seattle-based IJ attracted scathing criticism from the Ninth Circuit and unfavorable
public comment in 2002. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2002); Chris
McGann & Lise Olsen, Controversial Immigration Judge Won’t Be Transferred, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER
(Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Controversialimmigration-judge-won-t-be-1098273.php [https://perma.cc/257W-LVHR]. She then moved to Los
Angeles, where her decisions continued to garner unflattering attention. See, e.g., Smolniakova v.
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1047 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005); Rivera v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 835, 841–42 (9th
Cir. 2004); Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Judges Come Under Fire; Critics Say System
Oversight Is Weak, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 30, 2006. But she continued to decide cases, and she continued
to garner severe criticism. E.g., Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1111 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010).
Asked why complaints against this IJ would prove futile, a prominent immigration attorney insisted
that other IJs told him that the agency thought well of her work because “she clears a lot of cases.”
John Roemer, Jurist’s Asylum Seeker Rulings Earn Rebuke, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 31, 2006 (quoting
Robert Jobe).
224. E.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 8, at 331 (indicating an asylum grant rate of 12% in
Atlanta, compared to 40% overall).
225. E.g., Letter from Hallie Ludsin, Emory Law Sch., et al., to Juan P. Osuna, Dir., Exec.
Office for Immigration Review 5–6 (Mar. 2, 2017) (“[O]bservers [of Atlanta IJs] noted specific
examples of concern where IJs made statements that indicated potential prejudice against immigrant
respondents, or lacked the necessary patience, dignity, and courtesy required of IJs in immigration
proceedings.”).
226. Between October 1, 2009, and March 31, 2010, at least five complaints were filed against
IJ Pelletier. See Bryan Johnson, Secret Identities of Immigration Judges Revealed, AMJO LAW
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://amjolaw.com/2017/01/16/secret-identifies-of-immigration-judges-revealed/
[https://perma.cc/HD4R-Z47C] (including a “modified key” that lists complaints against IJs by date
filed). During this time period, eighty-seven complaints were filed against IJs nationwide. Executive
Office for Immigration Review, Complaints Received Between Oct. 1, 2009, and Mar. 31, 2010 (on
file with the authors). The EOIR employed 232 IJs in FY 2009. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, F ACT S HEET: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION JUDGE H IRING INITIATIVE 3 (2010). The average IJ, in other words, received .38
complaints during the time period IJ Pelletier received five.
227. Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, NATION (Oct. 20, 2010), https://www.thenation
.com/article/lawless-courts/ [https://perma.cc/PLC9-AY45].
228. See Continuing Oversight of the Social Security Administration’s Mismanagement of
Federal Disability Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care and
Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 27 (2013) (statement of
Glenn E. Sklar, Deputy Commissioner, Social Security Administration) (explaining the SSA
generally cannot issue strong discipline to ALJs such as furlough, suspension, or removal).
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cases,229 and its power to force ALJs to manage their cases in particular ways
is tightly constrained. 230 An ALJ bears almost no risk of termination. 231
Indeed, the SSA believes that it cannot suspend an ALJ without pay, much
less terminate him, until that ALJ has exhausted his appeals before the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB).232 This extended process can create
considerable delay. 233 After pleading guilty to a felony charge, for example,
an ALJ who had sexually assaulted an employee in a hearing room during
work hours while intoxicated received his salary for three more years until
the MSPB had finally finished its review. 234
Such protections, a (lesser) version of which IJs also enjoy, 235 give
agency adjudicators a plausible claim to independence. 236 But they can lead
to inertia or conflict avoidance within the agency and slow down or arrest
efforts to respond to decision-making pathologies. Notwithstanding repeated
federal judicial criticism of his performance,237 for instance, one ALJ
remained a hearing office chief administrative law judge until a class of 4,000
denied claimants filed a lawsuit against the SSA, alleging that due process
violations systemically plagued his and several colleagues’ case

229. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that to “coerce ALJs into
lowering reversal rates—that is, into deciding more cases against claimants—would, if shown,
constitute in the district court’s words ‘a clear infringement of decisional independence’”).
230. Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Butler, No. CB-7251-14-0014-T-1, slip op. at 24–25 (M.S.P.B.
Sept. 16, 2015); Emilia Sicilia, Combating Biased Adjudication in Claims for Social Security
Disability Benefits, CLEARINGHOUSE COMMUNITY (May 2014), http://povertylaw.org/
clearinghouse/stories/sicilia [http://perma.cc/3AT4-GDSF].
231. Role of Social Security Administrative Law Judges: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 46 n.10 (2011) (statement of Michael J.
Astrue, Comm’r, Social Security Administration) (indicating that between 2008 and July 2011, the
SSA tried to fire eight ALJs out of more than 1,000).
232. Id. at 46.
233. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A-06-16-50026, AUDIT REPORT:
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE USED FOR EXTENDED ABSENCES 3 (2017).
234. Id. at 3–4; Jillian Kay Melchior, Social Security Disability Judge Got $600,000 in Pay and
Three Raises After Drunkenly Groping Colleagues, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/444272/sridhar-boini-social-security-judge-sexually-assaultedcollogues-given-raises [https://perma.cc/Y5DF-4AMF].
235. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
369, 373–74 (2006).
236. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647
(2016) (describing ALJs as more independent than other administrative adjudicators who lack the
same statutory protections).
237. E.g., Lazo-Espinoza v. Astrue, No. 10–CV–2089, 2012 WL 1031417, at *14 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2012); Bailey v. Astrue, 815 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599–601 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Legare v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08–CV–2180, 2010 WL 5390958, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010);
Calderon v. Astrue, 683 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Gross v. Astrue, No. 08–CV–578,
2010 WL 301945, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010); Ginsberg v. Astrue, No. 05–CV–3696, 2008 WL
3876067, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008).
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management.238 Only upon the lawsuit’s filing did the SSA relieve the ALJ
of his management role. 239
3. Distinguishing Errors from Problems.—To succeed as overseers,
courts have to be able to distinguish problems from errors. Sometimes the
former are obvious. A sharp uptick in court remands suggests something
more systematic afoot than idiosyncratic adjudicator error. When the SSA
terminated disability benefits for hundreds of thousands of claimants in the
early 1980s,240 appeals flooded the courts, and the court remand rate jumped
from 19% in 1980 to nearly 60% in 1984.241 The SSA’s problematic policies
with regard to mental impairments and continuing-disability review quickly
became obvious.242 Likewise, if sufficiently awry, even a single flawed
decision can suggest an entrenched pathology. The Ninth Circuit described
an IJ’s decision denying asylum in a 2005 case as “a literally
incomprehensible opinion,” “indecipherable,” and “extreme in its lack of a
coherent explanation,” 243 flaws that loudly signaled a troubled adjudicator. 244
In many instances, however, problems manifest themselves less clearly.
These are ones where the bad policy or the entrenched pathology is subtler,
and thus demonstrates its faults only over time. The SSA provides ALJs with
a digital template that generates boilerplate for decisions. Before 2012, this
text included a poorly written paragraph that presented an ALJ’s findings in
a manner that suggested that the ALJ had improperly assessed the claimant’s
credibility.245 This flawed boilerplate is an example of a bad policy. But it is
one whose demerits as such—that is, as a policy and not a random error—
would likely become evident only as courts saw the same boilerplate over
and over again.
Courts catch problems of this scale by reviewing large numbers of cases,
identifying patterns of flaws, and determining that something more than
random error creates them. What follows is a highly stylized description of

238. Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Padro v. Astrue, No. 11–CV–1788, 2013 WL
5719076 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013), https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/2011-0504_Amended_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD54-6LW9].
239. Mosi Secret, Rejected Disability Claims in Queens May Be Reheard, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/nyregion/rejected-disability-claims-in-queens-maybe-reheard.html [https://perma.cc/7EXV-5A23].
240. DERTHICK, supra note 131, at 5.
241. Id. at 145.
242. Levy, supra note 146, at 487.
243. Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1187, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2005).
244. When interviewed about the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the IJ insisted that “the arguments”
from asylum claimants “were all the same.” Chorney, supra note 60.
245. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 639 (4th Cir. 2015); Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640,
644–45 (7th Cir. 2012); Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 943, 952 (E.D. Wis. 2013); Harvey
v. Astrue, No. CIV–10–393–SPS, 2012 WL 984299, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2012); Krusemark
v. Astrue, 725 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D. Iowa 2010).
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this process, one that no court of which we are aware actually uses. It owes a
debt to a method the SSA has pioneered, using Appeals Council data to find
problems in ALJ decision-making.246 We believe it illuminates the mental
steps courts proceed through as they identify problems. We present the
method here to argue how courts should oversee high volume agency
adjudication, and then defend their capacity to use it in Part IV.
The first step involves devising the proper classifications of potential
problems. As with problem-oriented policing, broad classifications are “too
heterogeneous” to yield much information about agency adjudication, 247 a
claim we elaborate upon at length in our report. 248 Problem-oriented policing
uses “highly nuanced and precise problem definitions.” 249 To understand
what factors generate burglaries in Tucson, Arizona, for example, the police
should not just keep track of “burglaries.” Instead they should also gather
data on “burglaries in college dormitories,” “burglaries in neighborhoods
with alleyways,” and so forth.
Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review should do the same.
In the social security context, for example, courts should identify potential
problems not as “remands,” or even “remands to the Brooklyn Hearing
Office.” Rather, courts should develop categories that can identify flawed
policies at the level of detail at which the agency crafts it, and they should
use categories that can identify entrenched pathologies at the level at which
they fester. The problems might be “treating source – opinion rejected
without adequate articulation,” or “inadequate rationale for credibility
finding.” 250 The entrenched pathology category might track decisions at the
individual ALJ level, and certainly at the hearing office level.
To identify patterns and thus potential problems, courts could then use
problem definitions to map data gathered from decisions. For any particular
judicial review context the map would differ and depend on courts’ sense of
where problems likely will come from and how they might materialize.
Table 3 tracks reasons for remands from judges in the hypothetical District
of East Dakota over a three-year period. It offers a simple illustration of how
a federal district might organize data capturing arguments made and reasons
given in social security cases.

246. Ray & Lubbers, supra note 143, at 1601–02; Letter from Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., to Xavier Becerra, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., Comm. on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives 6 (Dec. 5, 2012), https://waysandmeans.house.gov
/UploadedFiles/QFR_responses_MichaelAstrue_SS_6_27_12_BECERRA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YRY5-V537].
247. Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7
(2010).
248. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 52–56.
249. Reisig, supra note 247, at 7.
250. Top 10 Remand Reasons Cited by the Court on Remands to SSA, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC08_Top_10_CR.html#fy2015 [https://perma.cc/3RTQNZZW].
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Table 3. D.E.D. Remands as a Percentage of Appeals,
by Reason Given, FY2014–2016

Hearing
Office
No. 1

Hearing
Office
No. 2

Treating
source—
inadequate
articulation

Inadequate
rationale for
credibility
finding

Inadequate
rationale given
for weight, given
consultative
examiner’s
opinion

ALJ 1

0.33

0.4

0.22

0.29

ALJ 2

0.25

0.25

0.4

0.33

ALJ 3

0.6

0.62

0.65

0.74

ALJ 4

0.3

0.33

0.22

0.4

ALJ 5

0.58

0.64

0.56

0.72

ALJ 6

0.37

0.19

0.29

0.42

Mental
disorder
not
adequately
considered

Table 3 breaks down reasons for remands into more precise categories
that may correspond to detailed policy decisions the agency might make. The
SSA, for instance, might urge its ALJs to assess credibility in a particular
manner, or to use a particular approach to considering mental impairments.
These policy determinations should show up in arguments claimants make
for remands and reasons courts give for ruling in their favor. Table 3 also
recognizes the possibility that a particular ALJ might be deciding cases in a
pathological way, or that a particular hearing office suffers from pathological
management.
The district would then organize data on its judges’ decisions, to see if
they suggest any particular problems. The number in each of Table 3’s cells
is a fraction, indicating how often a court concludes that a particular ALJ’s
decisions contain particular flaws. The numerator represents the number of
cases in which the court agrees that the ALJ’s decision contains the flaw, and
the denominator is the number of cases in which the claimant argues that the
ALJ’s decision contains the flaw. Organized thusly, the data yield a heat map
that highlights potential problems. Table 3, for instance, indicates that ALJs
3 and 5 produce unusually high numbers of remands, regardless of the alleged
flaw, and have done so consistently. Their decisions’ high rate of failure
across the board may suggest adjudicator dysfunction, and its persistence
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over multiple years may indicate an entrenched pathology that the agency
cannot or will not correct.
Table 4 gives an example of a heat map that indicates an entrenched
pathology at the hearing office level.
Table 4. Hearing Office Pathology

Hearing
Office
No. 1

Hearing
Office
No. 2

Treating
source—
inadequate
articulation

Inadequate
rationale for
credibility
finding

Inadequate
rationale given for
weight given
consultative
examiner’s opinion

Mental
disorder not
adequately
considered

ALJ 1

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.6

ALJ 2

0.52

0.63

0.55

0.33

ALJ 3

0.58

0.4

0.48

0.59

ALJ 4

0.3

0.33

0.22

0.33

ALJ 5

0.4

0.27

0.38

0.4

ALJ 6

0.37

0.19

0.29

0.42

The consistency with which the District of East Dakota finds fault with
ALJ decisions from Hearing Office 1 suggests that the problem lies not with
a single idiosyncratic ALJ but with some office-wide phenomenon. But the
office-wide phenomenon is likely office-specific, because the ALJs from
Hearing Office 2 enjoy markedly better success across the board. A bad
policy should produce a heat map along the lines of what Table 5 illustrates.
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Table 5. Bad Policy

Hearing
Office
No. 1

Hearing
Office
No. 2

Treating
source—
inadequate
articulation

Inadequate
rationale for
credibility
finding

Inadequate
rationale given
for weight given
consultative
examiner’s
opinion

ALJ 1

0.33

0.25

0.28

0.65

ALJ 2

0.25

0.33

0.34

0.66

ALJ 3

0.4

0.44

0.32

0.59

ALJ 4

0.36

0.37

0.22

0.64

ALJ 5

0.18

0.19

0.25

0.7

ALJ 6

0.41

0.3

0.11

0.62

Mental
disorder not
adequately
considered

Again, as far as we know, no court actually uses this method or
something like it to identify problems with agency adjudication. But some
courts have engaged in an impressionistic version of the method for social
security and immigration cases. In a 2005 opinion, for example, the Third
Circuit marshaled a number of examples from cases to document “a
disturbing pattern of IJ misconduct” involving “intemperate or humiliating
remarks” directed at immigrants. 251 The Second Circuit listed six previous
instances when it had commented on a particular IJ’s inappropriate behavior
in an opinion reversing the IJ for another episode of similar misconduct. 252
The Tenth Circuit identified repeated instances when it faulted the SSA for
ALJ decisions that rely exclusively on boilerplate language for credibility
discussions.253 A district judge in Wisconsin came closer to what we
recommend here when he buttressed a scathing critique of “a wholly
dysfunctional administrative process within the Social Security
Administration” with pages of statistics demonstrating the agency’s poor
record before his court.254

251. Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267–68 (3d Cir. 2005).
252. Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Huang v. Gonzales, 453
F.3d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 2006) (also citing several previous cases rebuking IJ Chase’s conduct).
253. Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2005).
254. Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945, 955–67 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
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4. Responding to Problems.—Problem-oriented policing counsels for a
variety of responses beyond the mere arrest of perpetrators to address patterns
of criminal activity. A police department, for example, might deploy social
workers alongside police officers when criminal activity involves mentally
ill people. Hospitalization and treatment might be the interventions instead
of arrest.255 Congress as an oversight institution likewise can choose from an
extensive menu of tools when it addresses problems within an agency. 256 The
federal courts in contrast appear to lack remedial options beyond issuing
remands. They seem confined to error correction, a form of reactive, incidentdriven policing.
But courts in fact have several oversight tools at their disposal.257 First,
they can criticize agency adjudicators in terms calculated to cause
consternation or shame. In a 2005 opinion, for instance, the Third Circuit
denounced “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the
IJ” as “more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court
proceeding.” 258 A district judge singled out an ALJ and insisted that his
decision “shows a blatant disregard, not only of the legal standards, but of his
obligations as a judicial officer and the basic rights and humanity of a
vulnerable segment of our society, the disabled.” 259 Naming an IJ, the Second
Circuit included an extended and detailed summary of the many errors he
committed, including extensive quotations from the hearing he conducted, in

255. E.g., Cindy Chang, Across L.A. County, Law Enforcement Looks for Resources to Deal
with the Mentally Ill, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2016), http://beta.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-lnsheriff-mentally-ill-20160620-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/2XDN-WEQC]; see also Amy C.
Watson et al., Improving Police Response to Persons with Mental Illness: A Multi-Level
Conceptualization of CIT, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359, 361 (2008) (describing the Crisis
Intervention Team model created by the Memphis Police Department to respond to calls involving
a person suffering from a mental illness).
256. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:
AN OVERVIEW 9–14 (2010).
257. Christopher Walker has rigorously documented ways that federal courts reviewing agency
adjudication do more to extend their influence than simply remand cases for further adjudication.
Christopher J. Walker, Referral, Remand, and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 101 IOWA L. REV.
ONLINE 84, 88 (2016) [hereinafter Walker, Referral]; Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand
Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1590–99 (2014).
Courts use various tools, Professor Walker maintains, in part to “communicate to the agency
specific—and oftentimes even systemic—problems identified by the reviewing court.” Walker,
Referral, supra, at 90. We agree. The tools we describe here add to and build upon those Professor
Walker has identified.
258. Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Cham v. Attorney
Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006):
The case now before us exemplifies the “severe wound . . . inflicted” when not a
modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any pretense of fairness is extended to a
petitioner and the case he so valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again, under the
“bullying” nature of the immigration judge’s questioning, a petitioner was ground to
bits.
259. Lazo-Espinoza v. Astrue, No. 10–CV–2089, 2012 WL 1031417, at *8 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2012).
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a 2006 opinion.260 The Ninth Circuit reproduced an “incoherent” order by an
IJ in full as an appendix to a scathing opinion, letting the IJ’s incompetence
speak for itself.261
Courts can also exploit bureaucratic fault lines to force an agency to
respond. Agencies that lack independent litigating authority, such as the SSA
and the EOIR, control neither when they appeal to the federal circuits nor
their advocacy before the federal circuits. 262 The DOJ takes a very
conservative approach to what matters it wants to appear before the courts of
appeals, wary of administrative law precedent that might affect the federal
government’s litigating position trans-substantively. 263 Rather than risk an
adverse appellate decision, the DOJ might pressure the EOIR or SSA to
correct a problem instead. Another fault line involves the personnel who
defend ALJ and IJ decisions in federal court. They are not the same as those
who supervise agency adjudicators. 264 A DOJ lawyer may tire of defending
questionable decisions that prompt hostile court reactions and request that the
EOIR take some corrective action. 265 A court might threaten the agency’s
lawyer with sanctions if the agency continues to insist on defending flawed
decisions, or if the agency does not take steps to correct the problem.266
Courts can also adopt doctrines that raise the costs for agencies if they
do not correct a problem. The Ninth Circuit applies something called the
“credit-as-true” rule in social security cases. Until recently, 267 the most
commonly identified flaw with ALJ decisions involved their failure to
explain adequately why the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician did
not establish the claimant’s disability. 268 In most circuits, courts will remand

260. Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2006).
261. Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193–96 (9th Cir. 2005).
262. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.: SOURCEBOOK
OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 115–16, 116 n.296 (2012); GELBACH & MARCUS, supra
note 16, at 144.
263. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 145–46; BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 127–28 (3d ed. 1998); Neal Devins & Michael
Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 558, 572–73 (2003).
264. The DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation handles immigration appeals, and the SSA’s
Office of General Counsel, along with the U.S. Attorney, litigates social security cases in the district
courts.
265. See, e.g., HUME, supra note 126, at 24 (relaying interview comments that describe
informally modifying procedures in response to a court decision).
266. A district judge in Wisconsin did just this in 2013. David Traver, Warning of Sanctions
for U.S. Attorney, up to and Including Disbarment, TRAVER & TRAVER S.C.,
http://www.ssaconnect.com/260-sanctions [https://perma.cc/MWE3-SJGY].
267. The SSA replaced the treating-physician rule by regulation in January 2017. Revisions to
Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
268. E.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when he
rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it,
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cases with such treating-physician flaws. The ALJ gets another chance to
explain why the treating physician’s opinion does not merit deference. 269 In
the Ninth Circuit, however, courts must “credit as true” treating physician
evidence that the ALJ does not adequately discount.270 If that evidence, taken
as true, establishes the claimant’s disability, the court will remand for the
payment of benefits only and refuse to give the ALJ another crack at the
case.271 Particularly irritating to the SSA, 272 the credit-as-true rule raises the
cost of ALJs’ failure to grapple adequately with treating-physician evidence.
An additional tool dovetails with fire alarm oversight. Courts can draw
media attention to what are otherwise obscure and ignored parts of the federal
courts’ docket with scathing commentary or by otherwise publicizing what
can easily pass under the media’s radar. Judicial commentary on adjudicator
performance can buttress other advocates’ calls or efforts for reform.273 The
complaint in Padro v. Astrue,274 a class action filed in New York against the
SSA, quoted from dozens of judicial opinions remanding claims to support
allegations that some Queens Hearing Office ALJs systemically deprived
claimants of due process. 275
Finally, Article III judges can use their considerable prestige to pursue
reform while off the bench. Disheartened by the problems that have plagued
immigration adjudication, 276 Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit first
spearheaded a prominent study of immigrants’ access to counsel,277 then
created a public interest law organization that represents thousands of
immigrants in cases before IJs. 278 Margaret McKeown of the Ninth Circuit

asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with
boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.”).
269. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 123, at 20 (describing Ninth Circuit’s
doctrine that often denies the ALJ a second chance as an exception to the rule).
270. Id.
271. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020.
272. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. at
5859–60 (“In our view, the credit as true rule supplants the legitimate decisionmaking authority of
our adjudicators, who make determinations or decisions based on authority delegated by the
Commissioner. The credit as true rule is neither required by the Act nor by principles of due
process.”).
273. E.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, F AIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL C ASES 2–19 (2010).
274. No. 11–CV–1788, 2013 WL 5719076 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013).
275. Amended Complaint, supra note 238, at 24–66.
276. Katzmann, supra note 96, at 6–7 (chronicling and lamenting serious issues in immigration
adjudication).
277. STEERING COMM. OF THE N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION S TUDY REPORT,
ACCESSING JUSTICE: T HE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS 1–2 (2011).
278. The organization is the Immigrant Justice Corps. For information about its case load, see
Our Story: Our Impact, IMMIGRANT JUST. CORPS, http://justicecorps.org/our-story/#impact
[https://perma.cc/88JC-4UHV].
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helped kickstart a similar effort in San Diego, 279 as has Michael Chagares of
the Third Circuit in New Jersey. 280
IV. Evaluating Problem-Oriented Oversight
Problem-oriented oversight adds to the list of functions judicial review
can play in the context of high volume agency adjudication. In Part II, we
described institutional determinants that limited the contribution that any of
the other functions, on its own, could make to the case for judicial review of
high volume agency adjudication. Problem-oriented oversight strengthens
judicial review’s normative foundation only if it fares better by an analogous
institutional measure.
Problem-oriented oversight depends upon private litigants being able to
bring problems to the federal courts, the federal courts’ capacity to identify
and respond to problems, and the efficacy of those responses in terms of their
ameliorative effect on agency policy and behavior. In several regards, these
criteria resemble those that inform the choice between private enforcement
through civil litigation, on one hand, and public administration through
agency action on the other, as means for the implementation of a regulatory
regime.281
The literature on private enforcement addresses problems that differ
from the supervision of agency adjudication. An illustrative example is
whether lawmakers should pursue automobile safety through agency
enforcement, such as recalls, or through private civil litigation, such as tort
lawsuits. But this scholarship helpfully identifies a number of institutional
advantages and disadvantages that privately initiated litigation in generalist
courts has, at least as it compares with some form of direct agency action.
These considerations, or closely analogous ones, provide a useful blueprint
to assess courts’ capacity to engage in problem-oriented oversight. They
suggest that the federal courts can perform this function successfully. Judicial
review relies upon private litigants, those most directly affected, to bring
flaws with agency decision-making to courts’ attention. The process thus
produces information about pathologies or bad policy efficiently. The federal
courts’ independence from the agencies under review and Congress can
insulate their oversight from agency slack or political pressure. Finally,
Article III courts have sufficient influence with agencies to push for
ameliorative changes, and oversight focused on rooting out the sorts of
problems we describe does not overtax their expertise.

279. Johanna S. Shiavoni, ABA Immigration Justice Project Celebrates Its First Anniversary in
San Diego, NEWSL. (Fed. Bar Ass’n, San Diego Chapter, San Diego, Cal.), Spring 2009, at 6.
280. LORI A. NESSEL & F ARRIN ANELLO, DEPORTATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: T HE
ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE CRISIS F ACING NEW JERSEY’S IMMIGRANT F AMILIES i–ii (2016).
281. For a comprehensive list of the considerations implicated by this choice, see Stephen B.
Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & C LARK L. REV. 637, 662–71 (2013).
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Efficiency

The private enforcement of a regulatory regime through civil litigation
enjoys several efficiency advantages over public administration. Private
enforcement spares the expenditure of public resources on enforcement while
leveraging the capacity of the private bar toward this end. It also relies upon
those directly affected by the regulatory regime to trigger the enforcement
process and thus likely produces information about the regime’s
implementation or lack thereof particularly readily.282 The efficiency case for
problem-oriented oversight through judicial review is less straightforward,
but it probably favors it over other forms of agency oversight that do not rely
upon private initiative.
1. Resources.—Private enforcement enjoys at least two types of resource
advantages over public administration. First, the public bears only those
direct costs that relate to the judiciary’s involvement. Otherwise, the costs of
enforcement are internalized by the plaintiff, the party seeking to benefit, and
the defendant, the party that has allegedly violated the regime. Second, by
delegating the law enforcement task to private lawyers, private enforcement
multiplies the number of personnel involved in a regime’s implementation
without increasing the size of the federal bureaucracy.
Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review may not enjoy the
first advantage as convincingly. Because the federal government is the
defendant or appellee, it must foot its own defense costs and, at least for
social security cases, pay EAJA fees when claimants obtain certain types of
favorable outcomes.283 The agency could invest these resources in, say, an
expansive audit program if it did not have to litigate.
This sort of audit program, however, would require a politically dicey
expansion of the federal bureaucracy. The SSA’s program of pre-effectuation
review offers a useful comparison. Each year, the agency’s Division of
Quality randomly selects a small percentage of ALJ decisions that are
favorable to claimants, and thus cannot be appealed, for further review before
notice of the favorable decision goes to the claimant. In FY 2015, for
instance, the Division’s 119 staff members reviewed about 4,500 decisions
and identified concerns in approximately 900 of them. 284 The same year, the
federal courts remanded 8,646 cases. 285 Keeping the rate at which Division
staff members find flaws constant, assuming that each member’s caseload
remains fixed, and assuming that decisions denying and allowing claims

282. Id. at 662–64; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 108 (2005).
283. On EAJA obligations, see, for example, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
284. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A-12-15-50015, AUDIT REPORT:
PRE-EFFECTUATION REVIEWS OF FAVORABLE HEARING DECISIONS 1–2, 4 n.14 (2017).
285. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 85.
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contain errors with the same frequency, the Division would have to expand
by more than 1,000 staff members to catch the same number of mistakes as
the federal courts do. By delegating much of the problem-identification task
to private litigants and federal judges, judicial review spares the SSA this
immense bureaucratic expansion. 286
Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review is not necessarily as
resource-friendly as private enforcement, although the politics of
bureaucratic expansion may make its costs easier for Congress to swallow.
But the case for judicial review requires more. In Part II, we questioned the
value of court-based error correction on opportunity-cost grounds. The same
concern warrants discussion here: if the resources invested in judicial review
were spent instead on agency adjudication, would fewer problems arise in the
first place?
On this score, the distinction between problems and errors makes the
case for problem-oriented oversight stronger than that for error correction.
Errors may result because an overworked ALJ does not have time to review
a lengthy set of medical records thoroughly, or because an overextended IJ
cannot probe an immigrant’s story deeply enough. Logically, if the ALJ or IJ
had more time, as a lower case load might permit, she would make fewer
such errors. If the agency adopts a bad policy, however, an increase in
adjudicator resources will do nothing to decrease the number of problematic
adjudicator decisions. All decisions that comport with the policy, whether
issued by a harried adjudicator or a relaxed one, will suffer.
The same outcome likely obtains when problems result from entrenched
agency pathologies. If an SSA hearing office is mismanaged or suffers from
bad morale, the addition of a new ALJ or two, or the hiring of three new
decision writers, likely will not have a dramatic ameliorative effect. If an IJ
harbors bias against immigrants, or if an ALJ thinks that most claimants are
lazy ne’er-do-wells, a 10% caseload reduction is unlikely to change her mind.
Excessive caseloads may deepen a pathology’s entrenchment,287 but a
positive correlation does not necessarily or even often exist between
caseloads and pathologies. The SSA’s Miami Hearing Office, for instance,

286. Presumably, the SSA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) could shrink significantly if the
agency did not have to defend its decisions in the federal courts. Presently, OGC has about 600
lawyers. Regional Chief Counsel (Atlanta), USAJOBS (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usajobs.gov
/GetJob/PrintPreview/478378400 [https://perma.cc/RS5F-ZCRF]. If one assumes that each OGC
attorney spends five-sixths of his or her time on federal court appeals, an end to judicial review
could enable the SSA to downsize OGC by 500 lawyers. An investment of these resources in
Division of Quality staff would still require a net increase of 500 personnel.
287. See Marcia Coyle, Burnout, Stress Plague Immigration Judges, NAT’L L.J.
(July 13, 2009),
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202432173266/?Slreturn=
20170929151055 [https://perma.cc/C8ME-QRT9] (“[H]igh levels of burnout and stress may make
it difficult for immigration judges to recognize trauma in the refugees who come before them.”).
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suffers from management and morale problems, 288 even though its
productivity ranked it nearly last among the country’s 163 offices in FY
2017.289 In FY 2012, the year claimants filed Padro v. Astrue, the Queens
Hearing Office decided fewer cases per day per ALJ than those from any
other hearing office in the country. 290
2. Information Production.—Another efficiency concern relates closely
to the resources consideration. Private enforcement compares favorably to
public administration because it relies on those with the best information, the
injured parties, to identify misconduct and initiate a response. A version of
this advantage is one of the chief arguments in favor of fire alarm
oversight.291 Rather than proactively audit an agency itself, Congress can
more efficiently monitor agency performance if third parties bring
misconduct to its attention.
Judicial review unquestionably brings problems with agency decisionmaking to the fore more cheaply than some sort of internal agency auditing
process can. Depending upon how court access gets structured, barriers to
judicial review can select for cases that are most likely to involve flawed
decisions.292 As discussed in Part II, hurdles for social security claimants can
discourage a lot of potential appeals, and presumably those with strong
claims are more likely to tough it out. Lawyers who represent social security
claimants, to mention one barrier, get paid either by contingency or through
EAJA fees, both of which require a claimant victory in federal court. Such
hurdles should ensure that, of the appeals that get filed in federal court, many
involve flawed ALJ decisions. Some of these decisions will involve errors
and not problems, to be sure, and thus problem-oriented oversight succeeds
only if courts can reliably distinguish between the two categories. But the
subset is unlikely to involve a large number of correct decisions the way a

288. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A-12-15-50041, WORKLOAD
OVERSIGHT IN THE MIAMI HEARING OFFICE (2016).
289. National Ranking Report by ALJ Dispositions per Day per ALJ FY 2017, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/archive/04_FY2017/04_September_Disposition_
Per_Day_Per_ALJ_Ranking_Report.html [https://perma.cc/5UAX-NGT2].
290. National Ranking Report by ALJ Dispositions per Day per ALJ FY 2012, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/archive/04_FY2012/04_September_Disposition_
Per_Day_Per_ALJ_Ranking_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XKK-HQJ5].
291. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 183, at 168.
292. The incentives that fuel appeals or barriers that limit them may be more complicated in
other contexts. Some have argued, albeit with little empirical basis, that overly lax policies of
granting stays of removal pending review have incentivized immigrants to file meritless appeals.
Kagan et al., supra note 108, at 688, 692–94, 722–23. If so, then the pool of appeals before the
circuits will include plenty of reasonable IJ decisions. In contrast, robust evidence suggests that
detention discourages appeals. MILLER ET AL., supra note 103, at 131–32. Given that the immigrant
can leave detention if she abandons her appeal and accepts removal, the fact that she remains
incarcerated increases the likelihood that the IJ’s decision includes an error or resulted from a
problem.
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random audit might, and thus the system operates efficiently to bring
problems to courts’ attention.
The SSA’s Division of Quality example is again illustrative. From 2011
to 2015, the Division of Quality randomly selected 1.4% of ALJ decisions
allowing benefits for pre-effectuation review. 293 In 80% of instances, the
division “effectuated” the case with no further action taken, suggesting that
it found grounds for concern in only one out of five cases it reviewed. 294 Over
the same period, the federal courts remanded 43% of social security
appeals.295 Although the comparison between the two rates is not
straightforward, it suggests, however crudely, that properly incentivized
private litigants identify flawed decisions, and thus generate information for
oversight, more efficiently than a random audit can.
B.

Independence

The efficiency case for problem-oriented oversight through judicial
review contrasts it with something like an audit, a method that relies on
agency personnel proactively searching for flaws in adjudicator decisionmaking. But agencies can engage in their own version of problem-oriented
oversight through an appeals system. Internal appellate review places the
onus on the private litigant to come forward and thus should generate
information about agency performance more efficiently than a randomized
audit, if not as markedly so as Article III review. 296
Problem-oriented oversight through internal appellate review only
works if appellate personnel within the agency can catch problems and
respond to them successfully. In recent years the Appeals Council and the
BIA have attracted criticism for inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary
decision-making.297 This perceived problem surely results, at least in part,
from institutional determinants, including a paucity of time and resources. If
Appeals Council adjudicators have to decide up to twelve cases per day, then
their capacity to detect and respond to problems likely suffers. But the
institutional case for Article III review does not depend upon whether these

293. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 284, at 1.
294. Id. at 2.
295. For data on the percentage of remands from 2011–2015, see SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note
57.
296. One reason why internal agency appellate review might not generate information as
efficiently is that the barriers to appeal are lower. To appeal an ALJ’s decision, for example, a
claimant typically files little more than a three-page, often boilerplate letter identifying grounds for
reversal. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 28. Moreover, someone who appeals to federal
court has already appealed and lost within the agency, and thus has been pursuing her appeal for
longer and more doggedly than those who have only appealed within the agency.
297. E.g., David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177,
1180–81 (2016); see also GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 28 (“The last two digits of a
claimant’s social security number—not, say, the hearing office from which an appeal comes—
determines the branch to which an appeal goes.”).
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critiques are accurate or not. Article III review promises several
independence advantages that internal appellate review lacks.
The literature on private enforcement identifies independence as an
important advantage privately initiated litigation enjoys over direct agency
action. Public administration can suffer from “agency slack,” or “the
tendency of government regulators to underenforce certain statutory
requirements because of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or
the laziness or self-interest of the regulators themselves.”298 A concern in
times of divided government that the President might steer agencies away
from Congress’s regulatory objectives prompted the sharp increase from the
1960s onwards in the number of statutes delegating enforcement to private
litigation.299 Several analogous influences can interfere with an agency’s selfoversight. Review in Article III courts insulates oversight from these
pressures and enjoys an institutional advantage for this reason.
1. Agency Interests.—An agency may be tempted to oversee its
adjudicators in a manner that casts their performances in the best possible
light or that avoids internal conflict. In 2012, for example, the DOJ’s
Inspector General faulted the EOIR for measuring its own performance in a
manner that “overstate[d] the actual accomplishments of” immigration
courts.300 The EOIR used a method for counting case completions that
exaggerated IJ productivity, and it assessed efforts to meet timeliness goals
in a way that did not capture how long immigrants actually had to wait to get
their cases decided. 301 A quality-review system at the Board of Veterans’
Appeals samples one out of every twenty decisions by veterans’ law judges
(VLJs) to look for flaws. 302 A decision is considered flawed only if no
reasonable VLJ would have issued the decision under scrutiny, not if the
reviewer thinks the case was actually decided incorrectly.303 This threshold
may avoid conflict with VLJs, who might resent second-guessing by
personnel of less bureaucratic stature. But it does not come close to predicting
how well VLJ opinions will fare on appeal. 304
The self-interest problem can taint oversight through internal appellate
review as well. The SSA uses the Appeals Council “agree” rate as an

298. Stephenson, supra note 282, at 110.
299. SEAN F ARHANG, T HE L ITIGATION S TATE: P UBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE L AWSUITS
IN THE U.S. 216–17 (2010).
300. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 65, at i.
301. Id. at i–ii.
302. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-655T, VA D ISABILITY BENEFITS:
BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS H AS MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN Q UALITY ASSURANCE, BUT
CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR VA IN ASSURING CONSISTENCY 7 (2005).
303. Id. at 9–10.
304. See id. at 6 (reporting that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed or remanded
88% of the VLJ decisions it reviewed).
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indicator of ALJ performance, mining internal appeals for information in a
manner similar to what we describe in Part III. A rising agree rate indicates
improved ALJ performance, or so the logic goes. 305 But if the Appeals
Council’s review becomes more deferential, then a rising agree rate indicates
nothing at all about improved ALJ performance. Under these conditions, not
only does internal appellate review function less successfully as an oversight
mechanism, it can also affect other agency oversight methods that rely upon
information generated by the appellate tribunal. 306
Finally, an agency may simply not want to oversee itself, even if it can
glean information efficiently through internal appellate review. This
tendency is all but guaranteed when it comes to problems of flawed policy.
If the SSA instructs ALJs to use certain flawed text for discussions of
credibility, the Appeals Council will not fault ALJs for doing so, and the
problem will not show up in Appeals Council decision patterns. The SSA has
mined Appeals Council data to identify and root out some entrenched
decision-making pathologies, the second type of problem. But, as far as we
know, the EOIR has not used BIA decisions for this purpose. 307 In fact, as far
as we know, neither the EOIR nor the DOJ’s Inspector General has assessed
the quality of IJ decision-making using BIA data. Certainly neither has
embarked upon an effort to identify and respond to problems commensurate
with the campaign against pathologies in immigration cases the federal courts
of appeals have waged.
2. Political Independence.—Related to agency self-interest is politics’
looming influence. An agency might not prioritize problem-oriented
oversight, even if internal appeals offer it an opportunity to do so efficiently,
if such oversight is politically inexpedient. An agency might align its self-

305. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A-12-16-50106, AUDIT REPORT:
OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISIONAL QUALITY 1‒2 (2017) (stating that
“managers use agree rate results as well as other quality reviews to ensure ALJ decisionmaking is
consistent and accurate”); Ray & Lubbers, supra note 143, at 1604‒06 (associating a declining “rate
at which the Council remands to the hearing level” with “quality improvement”).
306. The SSA’s Inspector General, like all inspectors general, enjoys protections that enable it
to examine the SSA’s decision-making without interference from the rest of the agency. See
Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 1129, 1176 & n.225
(2016) (noting some of the “various institutional design protections” that assist investigations by
inspectors general); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National
Security Oversight, 65 S TAN. L. REV. 1027, 1035–36 (2013) (discussing the “broad investigative
powers” of inspectors general). But the SSA Inspector General does not generate raw data for
assessment purposes on its own; it instead relies upon what the agency itself assembles. In a recent
report on decisional quality, for example, it relied exclusively on the Appeals Council’s agree rate
as an ALJ performance measure. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note
284, at 1.
307. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 273, at 2-21–2-22. We submitted
a Freedom of Information Act request to the EOIR asking for information about its quality assurance
programs. We did not receive any information in response that indicated that the EOIR has used
BIA information for this purpose.
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policing with what it perceives as Congress’s preferences. Congress can
insist upon this alignment by enacting legislation requiring the agency to
focus on particular problems.308
The agency may prioritize certain forms of oversight over others, even
in the absence of legislation directing it to do so, to minimize conflict with
Congress. Starting in 2011, roughly at the same time as the Huntington
scandal, the SSA began to use Appeals Council data to identify problematic
ALJs for “focused reviews.” 309 Of the first fifty ALJs selected, thirty were
identified because they had allowance rates that exceeded 75%. 310 By FY
2013, the number of high-allowance-rate ALJs had dropped precipitously, 311
a fact the agency’s Chief Administrative Law Judge emphasized when she
insisted at a Senate Committee hearing that “quality is improving.”312 But the
number of low-allowance-rate ALJs, whose decisions are especially likely to
generate court remands, ticked up slightly during the same period. 313 All of
this happened as the SSA endured intense Congressional scrutiny for its
perceived profligacy with benefits. 314
In recent years, Congressional oversight of immigration policy has
emphasized enforcement.315 President Trump’s first budget blueprint
proposed that Congress authorize the EOIR to hire seventy-five new IJs,
insisting that doing so would help to “combat[] illegal entry and unlawful
presence in the United States.” 316 In light of such pressures, the likelihood
that the EOIR will prioritize oversight that looks for problems disadvantaging
immigrants seems low. 317
Congress’s formal power to oversee the federal courts notwithstanding,318 its attempts to exercise this power have been modest
compared with its scrutiny of federal agencies. 319 Moreover, the federal

308. Section 845(a) of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, for example, requires the SSA to
report on its efforts to combat fraud and prevent improper payment. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 845(a), 129 Stat. 584, 618.
309. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 149, at 6.
310. Id. at 13 & n.31.
311. Hearing on SSDI Abuse, supra note 196, at 131 fig.1.
312. Id. at 130.
313. Id. at 131 fig.1.
314. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, supra note 149, at 40–41
(reporting with detail on individual ALJ adjudicators and high allowance rates).
315. ANTJE E LLERMANN, S TATES AGAINST MIGRANTS: DEPORTATION IN GERMANY AND THE
UNITED S TATES 106 (2009).
316. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA F IRST: A
BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN 30 (2017).
317. On the susceptibility of immigration adjudication to political pressure, see AM. BAR ASS’N
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 273, at 2–24.
318. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1, 33–39 (2004).
319. For instance, while Congress has created inspectors general for a number of agencies,
including the DOJ and the SSA, efforts to do the same for the federal courts have failed repeatedly.
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courts’ diverse docket insulates them from some sort of politicized retaliation
should their decisions in agency appeals tend to skew in one manner or
another. Congress could always respond to a pattern of decisions it dislikes
by altering the federal courts’ jurisdiction or changing a standard of review.
But short of such focused legislation, Congress is unlikely to use another
sanction, like a budget cut, to pressure the federal courts because doing so
will adversely affect other, more privileged, areas of their docket.
C.

Capacity

Our critique of judicial review’s regulative function questions the
capacity of courts to force agencies to abide by precedent. Judicial efforts to
engage in problem-oriented oversight warrant the same scrutiny, although
what information presently exists indicates that courts may succeed in
prodding agencies to respond to their diagnoses of certain problems. The
literature on private enforcement suggests two other reasons to question
judges’ capacity to administer regulatory regimes: their inexpertness and the
limited geographic reach of their decisions. Neither is a concern for courtbased problem-oriented oversight.
1. Efficacy of Judicial Interventions.—The most obvious objection to
judicial review’s oversight function involves its efficacy. Neither the EOIR
nor the SSA mines court remands for information that might help its
adjudicators improve. One might expect agencies to act with similar
indifference when courts respond more aggressively to perceived problems.
A federal court can all but ensure that an agency will respond if it uses
extreme measures, such as Rule 11 sanctions, injunctive relief, or an approval
of a class action settlement requiring changes. 320 Courts rarely do so,
however.321 Still, the difference between an ordinary court remand and the
sort of opinion a court might issue when addressing a problem gives reason
to think that the latter can influence agency operations. 322
The agency can fully comply with an ordinary court decision if an
adjudicator conducts the proceedings on remand in accordance with the
court’s instructions. If the court demands nothing more, it cannot fault the

Casey C. Sullivan, Is It Time for an Inspector General of the Federal Courts?, F INDL AW (July 8,
2015), http://blogs.findlaw.com/federal_circuit/2015/07/is-it-time-for-an-inspector-general-of-thefederal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/8VFP-FFZQ].
320. The SSA recently settled a class action, for example, that requires it to give claimants who
were evaluated by a particular consulting physician a chance to seek benefits again. Plaintiffs’
Motion & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement Agreement at 4, Hart v. Colvin, 310 F.R.D. 427 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-cv00623-JST).
321. E.g., HUME, supra note 126, at 39 (describing courts’ sparing use of sanctions and
preference for lighter reprimands).
322. For similar optimism, see Walker, Referral, supra note 257, at 89–90.
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agency for treating the remand as a one-off and not a source of constructive
criticism. A decision concluding that “the ALJ failed to give specific and
legitimate reasons for discounting [a treating physician’s] opinion,” 323 for
instance, obliges the SSA to do no more than ensure the ALJ does so on
remand, regardless of whether the ALJ’s hearing office is dysfunctional or if
the ALJ routinely struggles with such evidence. A vast linguistic gulf
separates this remand from a decision like Freismuth v. Astrue,324 where the
district judge denounced disability adjudication as a “wholly dysfunctional
administrative process” and threatened the SSA with “very deep trouble” if
it didn’t take steps to fix observed problems. 325 In response to the decision,
the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin insisted that his office
had “been very much in conversation and communication – some of it quite
productive – with” the SSA.326
Robert Hume concluded his empirical study of agency responsiveness
to courts with the finding that “words” in opinions like Freismuth “seem to
matter,”327 for several reasons. First, “[w]hen opinion language leaves
agencies little room to maneuver, administrators might change their policies
to avoid sanctions and maintain favorable relationships with judges.” 328 As
repeat players, agencies know that they risk angering a judge who will surely
decide appeals going forward if they ignore clear instructions to change
course. While an angry judge could take out her anger on only a small number
of cases relative to the agency’s overall case load, agencies value their
“reputational capital” and “credibility” with the federal courts and do not
want to dissipate them. 329 Perhaps for this reason, the Department of Justice
has long had a policy of initiating an investigation any time a federal court of
appeals identifies an IJ by name in an opinion. 330
Second, Hume suggests that a clear, strongly worded opinion can
empower certain individuals within an agency who may prefer the sort of

323. Penoza v. Berryhill, No. C15-1825-RAJ, 2017 WL 1532667, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28,
2017).
324. 920 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
325. Id. at 945, 954.
326. Jane Pribek, Federal Judges Fired Up Over Social Security Cases, WIS. L.J. (Mar. 11,
2013),
http://wislawjournal.com/2013/03/11/federal-judges-fired-up-over-social-security-cases/
[https://perma.cc/Y39T-2PX4].
327. HUME, supra note 126, at 126.
328. Id. at 78–79.
329. Id. at 116.
330. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
2 (2015) (on file with authors); Immigration Prof., L.A. Immigration Judge Under Fire, LAW
PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (Dec. 20, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration
/2009/12/la-immigration-judge-under-fire.html [https://perma.cc/LJ8W-Q98V]. The SSA is more
vague about how it responds to judicial criticism, but insists that it “carefully analyzes Federal court
decisions” and “value[s] the courts’ perspective . . . .” Marilyn Odendahl, Disability Denials Draw
Criticism, INDIANAL AWYER.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles
/39934-disability-denials-draw-criticism [https://perma.cc/7XK2-36JS].
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policy adjustment the court counsels relative to those who favor the status
quo.331 Others have documented this “destabilization effect” within federal
agencies that judicial opinions can produce. 332 Perhaps agency officials have
ignored a general counsel’s recommendation that adjudicators use different
language when discussing someone’s credibility. The right sort of judicial
opinion faulting the agency for its credibility boilerplate can give the general
counsel significant leverage to insist upon a policy change.333
Third, as Hume reports, “[r]esearch on administrative behavior . . .
emphasizes that administrators are professionals who take their work
seriously and try to do what is right.” 334 Agency officials may feel obliged
out of a sense of professional obligation to respond when courts give
unambiguous and strongly worded feedback. 335 This assumption, that agency
personnel see themselves as professionals trying to discharge their mission
as successfully as possible, underlies many of the SSA’s efforts to improve
ALJ performance. 336 It might also explain why congressional oversight is
often effective.337 Congress rarely passes legislation when a fire alarm rings.
An agency may worry about its budget appropriation, but investigatory
committees rarely have budgetary powers, and appropriations are a clumsy,
blunt tool to use to insist upon specific change. 338 Maybe congressional
oversight works because agencies want to do the right thing. If so, court
pressure can have the same effect.
2. Expertise.—A standard critique of private enforcement compares
courts unfavorably to agencies as generalists lacking in sufficient expertise
to administer a regulatory regime optimally. 339 One version of this critique
challenges judicial review’s oversight function on grounds that courts cannot
diagnose problems with adjudication as expertly as agencies can. The charge
has force in two instances. First, a judicial attempt to force agencies into
large-scale procedural changes of the sort that could dramatically upend
settled agency practice should give pause. As Adrian Vermeule argues, “[t]he
federal judicial system is not set up, not equipped, to engage in a sustained

331. HUME, supra note 126, at 75–76.
332. Hal G. Rainey, What Motivates Bureaucrats?, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 303,
305 (2002) (reviewing MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS
AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2001)); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015,
1020 (2004).
333. HUME, supra note 126, at 76.
334. Id. at 8–9.
335. Id. at 113.
336. Ray & Lubbers, supra note 143, at 1598.
337. Beerman, supra note 178, at 121–22.
338. Kriner, supra note 180, at 784–85.
339. See supra note 120.
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course of synoptic institutional engineering.” 340 But, as Vermeule also
argues, the federal courts, aware of their institutional limitations, have largely
surrendered control over fundamental matters of procedural design to
agencies.341
The expertise critique also has some bite when courts fail to appreciate
that agency adjudicators have to optimize how they conduct their proceedings
under significant constraints. Although some federal judges have a decent
sense of the limits under which agency adjudicators labor, 342 others may be
surprisingly unaware of adjudicator caseloads and their inadequate
support.343 Attempts to micromanage how adjudicators manage cases deserve
criticism, as federal judges may not understand how resource inadequacies
constrain the process agency adjudicators can afford. 344
Most of the problems we have discussed in this Article, however,
require neither a deep appreciation for immutable determinants that require
adjudicators to act in certain ways nor an omniscient eye for large-scale
procedural design. The fact that IJs decide 1,000 cases per year does not
excuse IJ bias against categories of immigrants. The SSA has to ask ALJs to
decide 500–700 cases per year; flaws in the credibility boilerplate the agency
has ALJs insert into their decisions does not help them work through their
dockets more quickly. Properly conducted, problem-oriented oversight
should operate as a form of arbitrary and capricious review, a type of
oversight that permits the agency to continue in a particular procedural vein
if it has a plausible reason to do so.
A second version of the expertise critique is unique to judicial review of
high volume agency adjudication. This data gathering and analysis we
describe in Part III may seem far afield from core judicial competencies and
may beg the question of whether courts deciding one case at a time can
assemble information usefully from individual appeals that can accurately
indicate problems.
To a certain extent, our method merely illustrates the sort of thinking
that a judge should engage in to identify patterns and spot problems. A court
does not have to assemble precisely the heat map we describe. Indeed, court
competencies probably enable a district or circuit clerk’s office to develop an
even more sophisticated approach to problem identification. Some courts
already assemble some of the sort of information that a problem-oriented
340. ADRIAN VERMEULE, L AW’S ABNEGATION 115 (2016).
341. Id. at 123–24; cf. Paul Verkuil, Meeting the Mashaw Test for Consistency in
Administrative Decision-Making, in ADMINISTRATIVE L AW FROM THE INSIDE O UT: ESSAYS ON
THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 239, 246 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
342. Cf. Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(“[The Immigration Court] may well owe its dismal status to severe underfunding by
Congress . . . .”).
343. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 5–6.
344. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text.
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court would harvest from individual appeals. The Ninth Circuit does so for
all cases, not just one category or another. There, a staff attorney reviews
each appeal once it is fully briefed, judges its complexity, and prepares a
“case inventory” that identifies the issues the appeal raises. The issues get
entered into a searchable database to enable the Ninth Circuit to track it along
with cases raising similar issues. 345
The data analysis that problem-oriented judicial review requires should
likewise pose little challenge. The patterns courts can identify in the data
should prompt them to look at relevant appeals in a different light, but they
should not react mechanistically to some statistical anomaly as conclusive
proof of a problem. The SSA looks for outliers in ALJ decision data as guides
to where it needs to investigate further. 346 A trend’s emergence in court data
should likewise further investigation, albeit of the sort that a court can
undertake. Perhaps the fact that courts remand an IJ’s claims involving
immigrant credibility at an unusually high rate should signal to a judge that
she take a hard look at a particular appeal for signs of IJ bias. Judges should
not automatically remand a case involving mental impairments, much less
pen some screed on bad SSA policy, simply because remand data indicate a
sharp uptick across ALJs and hearing offices for cases involving mental
impairments. But such indications would signal to judges to pay particular
attention to how the agency describes applicable policy in such cases.
3. Geographical Dispersion.—The literature on private enforcement
cites the judiciary’s geographic dispersion as a comparative disadvantage.347
A federal agency can administer a regulatory regime uniformly, subjecting
the regulated entity to a consistent set of constraints nationwide. In contrast,
regulation through private tort litigation, for example, subjects the defendant
to different obligations in different places.
Geographic dispersion creates a somewhat different difficulty for
problem-oriented oversight through judicial review. When the problem is one
of a flawed policy, a court decision faulting the agency for its adoption suffers
the same limitations as one attempting to regulate the agency through
precedent. The agency, motivated by a felt obligation to administer a single
policy nationally and concerned about adjudicator inconsistency, might resist
making any changes in response to judicial chastisement.
When, however, a problem involves an entrenched decision-making
pathology, the federal judiciary’s geographic dispersion is often a feature, not
a bug. Provided that venue rules require that decisions from a particular set

345. Harry Pregerson & Suzanne D. Painter-Thorne, The Seven Virtues of Appellate Brief
Writing: An Update from the Bench, 38 SW. L. REV. 221, 223 (2008).
346. Ray & Lubbers, supra note 143, at 1594–95.
347. See, e.g., Burbank et al., supra note 281, at 667–68 (blaming a “decentralized” judiciary
as part of why private enforcement regimes lead to “fragmented and incoherent policy”).
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of adjudicators go consistently to a particular set of judges, 348 a
geographically dispersed system of judicial review will better ensure that
pathologies discoloring adjudication in a particular immigration court or a
particular hearing office come to a federal judge’s attention. Most appeals
from disability-benefits decisions rendered by ALJs in the Tucson Hearing
Office get filed in the District of Arizona.349 A District of Arizona judge will
see decisions by the same ALJ repeatedly and certainly will review decisions
from the same hearing office. If, however, all social security appeals were to
proceed in a single national social security court, the chances are slim that
one of its judges would see multiple appeals from the same ALJ or that one
of its judges would develop a feel for a problem arising at one of the SSA’s
166 hearing offices. If cases are randomly assigned, then a lot of time could
pass before one of the national court’s judges saw the same ALJ’s name on
an appealed decision, or even the same originating hearing office. A judge
on this national court would be more likely to mistake a problem for an error.
Conclusion
The standard justifications for judicial review of high volume agency
adjudication are unsatisfying. Institutional clashes interfere with the
corrective, regulative, and critical functions the federal courts attempt to
serve, rightly prompting doubt that the benefits courts create when they
discharge these functions exceed judicial review’s costs. Problem-oriented
oversight, suffering from fewer of these institutionally determined
limitations, creates additional benefits. When added to the mix, the
contributions courts make when they ferret out problems tip the balance in
favor of judicial review.
We recognize that the costs and benefits of judicial review are difficult
to quantify with precision. 350 Reasonable people may disagree with the
empirical assertions we make about how courts can act and how agencies
might respond. Even so, an understanding of problem-oriented oversight is
important for at least two reasons. First, as future scholars and policy makers
rethink judicial review of high volume agency adjudication, they should

348. On venue choices for social security cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). On venue for
immigration cases, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2012).
349. A Tucson ALJ will most likely decide cases involving Tucson claimants. See HALLEX,
supra note 158, at I-2-0-70 (“The [hearing office] will generally process all requests for hearing
(RH) for claimants residing in that area.”). Appeals from Tucson claimants to the federal courts
most likely will go to the District of Arizona. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Such action shall be brought
in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides . . . .”).
350. We thank Andy Coan for helping us to formulate this concluding thought.
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measure courts’ capacities to identify and help fix problems as they assess
the value of all the contributions courts can make. Second, and perhaps more
important, judicial review is here to stay, at least for the time being. As long
as it remains so, courts can maximize the value they add to agency
adjudication by engaging in problem-oriented oversight.

